Does John 17:3 Exclude Others, Such as Jesus Christ, as the "True God"? Part 5

Here's the last part of my exchange with Rob.

Bowman's Third Rebuttal and Final Remarks 

I’m going to answer the material from your series in a somewhat different order so as to bring related comments together, though I will indicate which part (of your 9-part series) I am citing or answering as I go along. To avoid confusion, I will label my responses with capital letters instead of numbers.

A. WHAT MIGHT JOHN 17:3 MEAN?

In this Part A, I will be responding to your Parts 1 and 6. Let’s start by revisiting what I labeled P1 and P2:

P1. Only the Father is the true God.

P2. The Father is the only true God.

In Part 1, you wrote:

// In your first rebuttal, you stated: "John 17:3 *expresses* P2, *not* P1, and orthodox Christians accept P2" (asterisks added). Then I asked if you're saying that John 17:3 *strictly* requires the P2 expression. You replied: "No, I'm saying it *need not* mean P1 but *might* mean just P2" (asterisks added). I see that you went from a hard claim to a soft one. //

Actually, my claim didn’t change, though I can see that a lack of clarity on my part made it seem that way. You see, as I distinguished these two premises, if P1 is true then P2 must also be true, but the reverse is not the case: If P2 is true, then P1 might or might not be true. Thus, when I argued that John 17:3 expresses P2, I was saying that all we can with certainty infer from John 17:3 is that P2 is true; whether P1 is also true remains to be determined. John 17:3 certainly expresses P2; whether it also expresses P1 is debated. To put it in plain English, if the Father is the only true God, then it might or might not also be the case that *only* the Father (to the exclusion of the Son or the Holy Spirit) is the true God.

I had argued that we should distinguish two interpretations of John 17:3, to wit:

P1: Only the Father is the true God.

P2: The Father is the only true God.

In your Part 6, after some explanation of your reasoning concerning the apposition in John 17:3, you offered what you said was a third interpretation:

P3: Only the Father is the only true God.

From my perspective, there is no substantive difference between P1 and P3. I don’t think setting forth P3 in any way advances the discussion. Sorry.

As I have explained, if P1 is true, then P2 must also be true, but the reverse is not the case. One might affirm P2 (as I do) without affirming P1 (as in my case, since I do not affirm P1). P2 is logically entailed in P1, but (I argued) P1 is not logically entailed in P2. At the very least, P1 asserts something more than P2 as I and many others understand it.

On the other hand, P1 and P3 entail one another fully and without qualification. P3 just restates P1 perhaps more emphatically via redundancy, but it does not add anything of substance to P1, because anyone who affirms P1 will affirm P3, and anyone who affirms P3 will affirm P1. This observation cuts across theological lines, since Unitarians, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and (at least some) Monarchical Trinitarians accept both P1 and P3 (and of course, as I have explained, they all accept P2).

You wrote (also in Part 6):

// I then replied saying that I didn't see anywhere that I conceded the point and that I was still maintaining that the appositive merely *allows* the interchangeability of "Father" and "the only true God" as subject and predicate, not that it *logically* must be. I continued "I see no restriction to this. You would need to provide an argument why P2 (The Father is the only true God) is *strictly* the required expression of John 17:3, if this is your position." (This is because in your first rebuttal you stated that John 17:3 *expresses* P2, *not* P1, and orthodox Christians accept P2.) Then after I pressed if you're saying that John 17:3 *strictly* requires the P2 expression, you replied in your second rebuttal stating that it *need not* mean P1 but *might* mean just P2. So, you went from a hard claim to a soft one. Again, I don't claim that the said interchangeability is a necessity. I only claim that the grammar allows it. As shown, P3 is established from the appositive found in John 17:3, the allowable interchangeability, and a logical conversion. To repeat what you claimed: John 17:3 *need not* mean P1 but *might* mean just P2. I would just say that John 17:3 *could* mean P3. //

Again, I did not change from a “hard” claim to a “soft” claim regarding P1 and P2. My position has always been that P2 does not logically require P1.

Oddly, you missed a key element of my reply to your comments that you quoted above. In reply to your comment that I need to provide an argument for interpreting John 17:3 to mean P2 but not P1, I wrote:

“I'm not using John 17:3 in an attempt to disprove your position. The burden of proof is on you, not on me. You must show not just that the appositive allows such interchangeability but that it requires it. To answer your objection, all I need do is to show that the appositive does not necessarily require such interchangeability.”

Let me expand just a bit on this point. If all you are claiming is that the grammar of John 17:3 “allows” a full interchangeability between “Father” and “only true God,” then you cannot use that possible full interchangeability to make a strong case that Jesus is not the true God. What I would suggest is that you must decide which of the following propositions you wish to defend:

P1/P3: Only the Father is the (only) true God.

P4: It could be the case that only the Father is the (only) true God.

There is no way to get logically from P4 to the conclusion, “Therefore, Jesus is not the true God.” You need P1/P3 as a premise of your argument.

Really, I could stop here. Again, I am not using John 17:3 to disprove Unitarianism but only responding to an attempt to use John 17:3 to disprove the belief that Jesus is the true God. If you aren’t claiming that John 17:3 disproves the belief that Jesus is the true God but only that it might be interpreted in a way incompatible with that belief, then I don’t really need to refute that interpretation.

B. EXAMPLE AND COUNTEREXAMPLES

Here I will be responding to most of your Part 2. You wrote:

// To repeat, I said in my first rejoinder that I'd like to hear you engage my statement: In John 17:3 "only" is used as a quantifier, which is making a quantification that the "true God" is *none* other than the Father. //

The Greek word μόνος is a “quantifier” (as is the English word “only”), meaning that it is an expression that indicates the scope of the term to which it is attached (in this instance, “true God,” ἀληθινὸν θεὸν). However, whether it indicates, as you put it, “that the ‘true God’ is *none* other than the Father” is precisely the point at issue here.

Your Part 2 focused mainly on your proposed example to show that “the Father is the only true God” and “Only the Father is the true God” are identical propositions, and my two examples to show that we should be cautious about making that claim if it results in the Bible contradicting itself. Let’s look first at your example. You wrote:

// I said that "from the standpoint of the way the language is used in the Bible, it does not matter where 'only' is placed. We know that the statements 'Jesus is the only begotten Son' and 'only Jesus is the begotten Son' have the same meaning in so far as 'only' is placed in the statements. //

In my first response to the above statement, I pointed out that in the New Testament the expression “only begotten” translates one word, μονογενής, and therefore you cannot move “only” to a different place in the sentence while leaving “begotten” in the same place. That still seems to be a relevant response to your example. I should also have pointed out that your example sentences are not in the Bible, so they cannot illustrate “the way the language is used in the Bible.” I do agree that your two hypothetical sentences might seem to mean the same thing in English, but they definitely would not mean the same thing if translated into Greek with μονογενής used to represent “only begotten.”

Now let’s look at my two examples of the principle that the word “only” should not always be interpreted in the fashion your argument requires. You wrote:

// In Gen. 7:23, we can see the context; it's right there in front of us, and a little reading comprehension would help. Although in singular form, the word "only" is used in a collective sense. Question: Who is/are left? Answer: Noah *and* those that were with him in the ark. There is nothing else that is predicated to "those that were with him in the ark" but "only". //

Here’s the Greek text of the relevant clause in Genesis 7:23 LXX:

καὶ κατελείφθη μόνος Νωε καὶ οἱ μετʼ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ κιβωτῷ

“And Noah only was left, and those with him in the ark.”

Here the verb κατελείφθη (“was left”) is singular, not plural; the subject of the verb, grammatically speaking, is Νωε (“Noah”). The grammatical subject of the verb is not the collective “Noah and those with him in the ark.” To translate it, “Noah and those with him in the ark alone were left” (treating the verb as a plural and μόνος as referring to both Noah and those with him in the ark) is an acceptable paraphrase, but it is not a literal translation of the Greek text. Grammatically, μόνος modifies Νωε; it does not modify οἱ μετʼ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ κιβωτῷ. Nevertheless, by reading it in context, we construe the sense of the sentence in such a way that “those with him in the ark” were left with Noah. But that isn’t how the sentence is worded, which was the point I was making.

Regarding John 8:9, you wrote:

// How about the way "only" is used in John 8:9. ESV renders the text as follows: "But when they heard it, they went away one by one, beginning with the older ones, and Jesus was left alone with [kai] the woman standing before him." ESV and some other English versions do translate kai as "with" (e.g., HCSB, NIV, NRSV, MOUNCE). Others translate it as "and" (e.g., ASV, NASB). As you know, since you're expert in Greek, this means that the Greek allows translating kai as "with" and "and". It's remarkable that you would translate this text to say that Jesus "was left alone [monos], and [kai] the woman who as in the midst" (John 8:9b)--not that you disagree translating kai as "with"; I would hope not. So, question: Who is/are left alone? Answer: Jesus *and* the woman; Jesus *with* the woman. Either way the context tells us that there were two left: Jesus and the woman. //

Again, the issue is not how we should translate the sentence in order to bring out its sense in good, smooth English. The issue is what the Greek text actually says—how the sentence is constructed in Greek. Here is the Greek text:

καὶ κατελείφθη μόνος καὶ ἡ γυνὴ ἐν μέσῳ οὖσα.

“And only he was left, and the woman who was in the midst.”

Here we have the same verb as in Genesis 7:9 LXX, κατελείφθη, which is a singular form. The subject is not stated but is singular, “he,” not plural, “they.” The syntax parallels Genesis 7:9 LXX rather closely though without the personal name: κατελείφθη μόνος, followed by καὶ, followed by an expression identifying others who were left: ἡ γυνὴ ἐν μέσῳ οὖσα. In both texts, the verb is singular and has as its subject one person (Noah, Jesus), not two or more.

Of course, when translating the text into English, one might opt for a smoother translation such as “And only he was left along with the woman,” or even “And only he and the woman were left.” But we are discussing your claim that the grammar of the Greek text in John 17:3 locks us into the conclusion that only the Father, to the exclusion of the Son (or the Holy Spirit), is the true God. In that context, I am pointing out that sometimes the Greek texts use the word μόνος in such a way that grammatically, if pressed strictly in the kind of way you are doing with John 17:3, you would conclude that the text was contradicting itself.

As I acknowledged when I first presented this argument, the construction in these two texts is a different one than the construction in John 17:3. But the principle is the same: We must beware of overreading the grammar in such a way as to make the Bible contradict itself.

Following up on my warning that construing “only” in such a way as to result in the Bible contradicting itself is “woodenly simplistic,” you wrote:

// But, let's assume arguendo that you're right about characterizing my approach as "a woodenly simplistic grammatical analysis". What happens then? Answer: All the talk about P1 and P2 you've been making should be relegated to the trash bin of "a woodenly simplistic grammatical analysis". //

My distinction between P1 and P2 is not based on a wooden or simplistic grammatical analysis, but is, rather, an argument for not assuming P1 on the basis of such an analysis! I don’t think your attempt at deflection here works at all.

C. LOGIC, GOD, AND THE INCARNATION

This post will be brief; it responds to your closing comments in your Part 2. You wrote:

// "You're saying that, if God is triune, the logic of predication is stipulated to work somewhat differently. Is it because God is unique in that God is triune? Explain how this is. You're not saying that logic works differently when comes to God. Are you? I hope not. I would like you to be as clear as you possibly can when you explain yourself here please." //

To be more precise, I’m saying that logic has limits when applied to ontological issues pertaining to God due to the radical transcendence and uniqueness of the divine being. You might find these two blog posts of mine helpful to understand my thinking on this subject:

https://robertbowman.net/2019/04/18/dale-tuggy-and-the-biblical-basis-of-the-trinity-part-2-is-the-doctrine-of-the-trinity-incoherent/

https://robertbowman.net/2018/07/25/the-light-analogy-theological-method-and-the-doctrine-of-the-trinity/

You wrote:

// Whatever the case maybe, I wonder how far you would go with your "finite beings" versus "divine persons united as/in one divine being" talk. Of the divine persons you referred to, I'm sure, is Jesus Christ. You believe that he is God-man, divine-human, and infinite-finite. If we follow your line of reasoning, it would seem that the application of the Bible talk on only would apply to the finite part (man/human) of Jesus but not to his infinite part (God/divine). He declares in John 17:3, "And this is eternal life, that they know you [Father], the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent." Jesus Christ is God-man. The Bible talk on only would apply to the "man part" of Jesus Christ, but would not apply to the "God part" of him. How would you manage to explain this? //

No, it doesn’t work that way. The hypostatic union of divine nature and human nature in one person (Jesus Christ) is itself another theological concept with which one would expect to run up against limits to logical analysis. It isn’t just God in the abstract that is the occasion of such limits, but also God in relation to the world (see my response to Tuggy cited above for an example). The Incarnation is simply a more profound and pointed instance of this problem of limits to logical analysis regarding God.

D. ARGUMENTS AND ASSUMPTIONS

In this Part D, I will be responding to your Parts 3, 4, and 5. In Part 3, you wrote:

// We, Unitarians, *do* have an argument, and in our exchange I framed the argument (and provided details), namely: "From the standpoint of the way the language is used in the Bible, it does not matter where 'only' is placed." Now, Rob, in your constant auto-accusation of "assuming Unitarianism," you have continually mischaracterized what Unitarians are doing: You are conflating the *method* (basis) with the *content* of the view--the method and basis being the application of the way the Bible uses the word only; the content being Unitarianism. Let's just say that my argument does not go through, because you've somehow shown it to be unsuccessful. Fine. That does not mean I have no argument; neither does it mean I'm assuming Unitarianism; only that my argument fails. //

I didn’t deny that you had an argument. I argued in response that your argument presupposed Unitarianism, not that you didn’t present an argument. Arguments have presuppositions or proceed on the basis of assumptions all the time. Saying that you were presupposing Unitarianism was not a denial that you presented arguments.

So far, you have not presented any examples of texts using the word “only” in different places in the sentence in order to illustrate your claim that it does not matter where “only” is placed. That makes it difficult to treat as much of an argument, even though it looks like an argument. Your sole example was of two sentences that you invented that are not in the Bible and in which an English translation (“only begotten”) of a single Greek word (μονογενής) was treated as though it represented two Greek words, one of which was μόνος.

I’m passing over your analogy to debates between advocates of differing models of the Trinity because I think I can get at the problem without going through that analogy point by point.

You wrote:

// Your accusation sounds like this: "Aaron, you're assuming Unitarianism, because you're assuming that your argument for Unitarianism is successful." Well, of course! As you know full well, that's just how things work in the discipline of reasoning and argumentation. What is stopping me from saying to you: "Rob, you're assuming Trinitarianism, because you're assuming that your argument for Trinitarianism is successful"? //

I don’t see things this way at all. As I’ve explained above, one can presuppose or assume something when presenting an argument. People do it all the time. Essentially, what I am saying can be outlined as follows: You argue that A is true, therefore B is true; however, B is a hidden (unstated) assumption of A. I’m certainly not claiming that you must be assuming Unitarianism because you think your argument for it is successful. I have no objection in principle to you presenting an argument that you believe successfully vindicates your position.

I’ll give you a simple example of the type of presupposition or assumption I see in Unitarian arguments all the time. I constantly find Unitarians arguing as follows:

F. God cannot die.

G. Jesus died.

Therefore,

H. Jesus is not God.

The above argument presupposes that Jesus could not be both God and man simultaneously, as is believed in the doctrine of the Incarnation. Thus, it assumes what it claims to be proving. A fuller statement of the argument would give this away:

E. God cannot become incarnate in mortal human nature.

Therefore,

F1’. God cannot die (even by becoming incarnate and undergoing death in his assumed mortal human nature).

G. Jesus died.

Therefore,

H. Jesus is not God.

Yes, this is an argument for Unitarianism, but now we can plainly see that it presupposes what it claims to be proving. That’s an example of what I mean when I say that you could present an argument for your view and yet be assuming or presupposing that your view is true.

In Part 4, you wrote:

// The first horn says, "assume P1 *and* interpret it as excluding the Son as eternal deity (thereby presupposing Unitarianism)." Well, the same Monarchical Trinitarians (I discussed) do assume P1 *and* interpret it as excluding the Son from being "the only true God" with the understanding that "true" is not to be contrasted with "false" but instead expresses how the Father is personally distinct from the Son and the Spirit. Does this, thereby, mean that those Monarchical Trinitarians are presupposing Monarchical Trinitarianism? Your answer would have to be yes, if you're consistent. //

That would be the case if the Monarchical Trinitarians argued that John 17:3, all by itself, proves Monarchical Trinitarianism. Then I would say that yes, if they use John 17:3 in that way, they are assuming that P1 would exclude Jesus as “true God.”

You wrote:

// The first part of the first horn says that I must "assume P1". If you mean "assume" without an argument, that again, Rob, is a mischaracterization of what "assume P1" means. //

As I have already explained, presenting an argument is not incompatible with that argument proceeding on the basis of an unstated assumption or presupposition.

If you are actually acknowledging that the Monarchical Trinitarian position is consistent with John 17:3, then you would not be presupposing Unitarianism. By the same token, then, you would be conceding that John 17:3 does not prove Unitarianism, because it would be consistent with at least some form of Trinitarianism.

Since you seem most concerned throughout your Parts 3 through 5 to counter my evidently offensive saying that your argument for P1 presupposes or assumes Unitarianism, and since perhaps your argument allows Monarchical Trinitarianism as a possible interpretation of the evidence, I will restate my argument so that this particular offensive element is removed. Here goes:

In order to show from John 17:3 that Jesus is not the true God, you must show that John 17:3 means not just that the Father is the only true God but also that the Father alone is the true God to the exclusion of the Son. I claim that you have not successfully shown this to be the case. At most, you have shown that John 17:3 could be interpreted in a way consistent with that view.

In my opinion, your attempt to construct an argument for your conclusion did not go beyond merely asserting it, because you actually gave no evidence for it (recall the problem with your argument about “only begotten”).

Your Part 5 labors under the same false dichotomy between proceeding on the basis of an assumption and constructing an argument. I won’t repeat my response to this false dichotomy again.

E. ARGUMENTS FROM SILENCE

In this Part E, I respond to your Parts 7 and 8, which were responses to my contention that in two instances you presented fallacious arguments from silence.

(1) Not Included, Therefore Excluded

The first argument was the inference from Jesus’ failure to include himself as true God in John 17:3 that Jesus was excluding himself from being true God. I argued that this was an argument from silence. In your Part 7, you replied to that criticism:

// Rob, I don't think I'm guilty of an argument from silence. You painted a caricature of my argument. My argument does not fallaciously draw an inference from the fact that something is *not* stated in the context. Rather, it draws an inference from the fact that something is *implied* by what *is* stated in the context. My argument can correctly be restated as follows.

P1. He included only the Father, and not himself and others.

C. Therefore, he excluded himself and others.

Most people do seem to take for granted that that which is not included is excluded, which by itself can be an argument from silence, depending on the context. But my argument doesn't commit this fallacy. As can be seen in the restatement, the words "only" and "did not include" bring out the implication of *exclusivity*. //

Aaron, everyone agrees that there is exclusivity expressed (not just “implied”) in John 17:3. To assert that there is an “only true God” is to exclude all other Gods as being “true God.” That is what the words mean. Everyone agrees on this point.

I was not criticizing you for understanding John 17:3 to express an exclusivity, but for your specific inference that the statement necessarily excludes Jesus Christ from being “true God.” Your restated argument still infers this particular exclusion from the lack of a stated inclusion of Jesus Christ. And that is an argument from silence.

You wrote:

// When I asked you the two questions above, you replied stating that Jesus *excluded* "anyone that would claim or be viewed as a different God than the one true God" and that his "statement only specifically included the Father." Now, how in the world did you manage to draw "excluded" from what Jesus declared in John 17:3 which reads: “And this is eternal life, that they know you [Father], the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent”? You don't see "excluded" there. It is not stated. Does this mean you're guilty of "a blatant argument from silence"? It would appear so. //

Not at all. My statement that Jesus’ statement excluded other Gods makes no reference to what is not verbally included but proceeds directly and solely from the words “only true God.” If there is an “only true God,” then any *other* (so-called) God would not be “true God.” The word “only” is exclusionary by definition. Thus, my statement simply reasserted in other words what the words “only true God” entail. I made no appeal whatsoever to what was not said in John 17:3 or who was not stated there to be “included” as true God. But you did make such an argument, and it is an argument from silence.

(2) Not Stated There, Therefore Not Important or Even True

The second argument I described as an argument from silence was your argument that if knowing Christ as the true God is crucial for salvation, then Christ should have mentioned this fact in John 17:3; and since he did not, you inferred not only that it wasn’t important for salvation but that it wasn’t even true. You replied to my criticism in your Part 8:

// I said that I maintain that if Christ being the only true God--too, in addition to the Father--is part and parcel of knowledge of eternal life, then he missed a great opportunity to mention that one very important information. Well, he didn’t mention it. It must not be important and, for that matter, true…. I don't think it is an argument from silence. I would call it an argument from extreme importance. For you, the following is an extremely important and non-negotiable aspect of Christianity: Part and parcel of *knowledge* of eternal life is Jesus being God in the same sense as the Father is. In other words, in order to attain eternal life one must accept and hence have knowledge of Jesus being God. Yet, for you, "knowledge" of that which is *extremely* important and *non-negotiable* was not important *enough* to be mentioned by Jesus in John 17:3 or anywhere within the immediate context of the text. On the other hand, I think that, if it is *that* important, we would expect Jesus to mention it *and* be direct about it. //

I believe I have already addressed your argument. You are imposing on Jesus in his prayer at that particular moment an expectation that does not follow from the belief that Christ’s being the true God is a salvific issue. It was not incumbent on Jesus to present that truth whenever he spoke about salvation or about the deity of the Father, even if that truth was one that would eventually come to be recognized as of salvific importance. Jesus almost always spoke about his identity indirectly, in ambiguous terms.

I have given two reasons why Jesus did not talk openly and explicitly about his deity during his mortal ministry. The first is that Jesus was part of an honor/shame culture in which it was inappropriate to assert honors for oneself. Instead, one was to receive honor from someone in a position to bestow it. The Son had humbled himself, becoming a man, and in doing so had chosen to place himself in a situation in which full recognition of his deity would come through his vindication following his resurrection and ascension. Second, Jesus’ contemporaries, prior to his resurrection and ascension and the subsequent coming of the Holy Spirit, would likely not have understood a direct claim to deity as other than a claim to be the Father. These two explanations, which are complementary and not mutually exclusive of one another, are not strictly speaking logically necessary in order to rebut the objection that Jesus should have revealed that he was the true God in John 17:3. But these explanations are sufficient plausible as to negate the seeming plausibility of the argument that he should have mentioned his deity at that particular point in time.

Again, the argument is indeed an argument from silence. Calling it “an argument from extreme importance” does not eliminate the appeal to silence that is part of the argument. Your argument still has the following form:

M. If Christ being the true God were of extreme importance for salvation, then Jesus would have mentioned his deity in John 17:3.

N. Jesus did not mention his being the true God in John 17:3.

Therefore,

O. Christ being the true God is not of extreme importance for salvation.

That’s an argument from silence (because premise N consists of an assertion of silence).

Moreover, you went even further. Remember, you wrote:

// Well, he didn’t mention it. It must not be important and, for that matter, true. //

That last part—“and, for that matter, true”—clearly goes beyond the evidence of your premises.

Finally, let me say that I do not think it is a salvific issue to know that non-Monarchical Trinitarianism, over against Monarchical Trinitarianism, is true. I don’t think Monarchical Trinitarians are in jeopardy of missing out on salvation. In this respect, it is not essential to salvation to know that Jesus is properly called “true God” in the sense denied by Monarchical Trinitarians.

F. CONCLUSION

Aaron, this Part F responds to your concluding Part 9. You wrote:

// In my OP, I wrote at the end: "Together these considerations seem to make a cumulative case for thinking that John 17:3 excludes others—such as Jesus—as the 'true God' or 'the only true God'". Notice that I used the word *seem*. I was trying to be modest. Thus far, I believe that I've been able make a good case based on four considerations as they stand together and in view of the refutations I provided. To be sure, I have to wait for your final remarks to see if my case stands. //

Very well: Let’s review those four considerations from your opening post. You wrote there:

// 1. The language of the text appears to exclude Jesus as true God. If the Father is the only true God, then no one else is. //

In our subsequent discussion, you explained, “the appositive merely *allows* the interchangeability of ‘Father’ and ‘the only true God’ as subject and predicate, not that it *logically* must be.” But if the two terms might not always be interchangeable, then it might be the case that Jesus is true God. So this consideration does not make it more probable than not that Jesus Christ is not true God. You would need to strengthen your claim to say that the appositive probably or most likely entails complete interchangeability in all contexts (see further my Part A).

I also showed that your one example offered to illustrate that “the Father is the only true God” means the same thing in biblical language as “only the Father is the true God” failed to support your argument. Your example made the mistake of treating “only begotten” as representing two words in Greek when that expression represents one Greek word, μονογενής. Moreover, your example sentences are not found in the New Testament (see my Part B).

I also noted that when you brought up the Monarchical Trinitarians who accept the deity of Christ but consider the Father alone to be the “true God” (in the sense of the divine person who is neither begotten nor proceeding from another), you were in effect admitting that even if only the Father is “true God,” this conclusion would not disprove the deity of Christ or the Trinity. At most, your line of argument criticizes the non-Monarchical type of Trinitarianism that affirms that the Son is the true God. Do you agree that your argument has that limitation?

In your opening post, your second point was as follows:

// 2. …According to the text, the only person Jesus places in the category “the only true God” is the Father—no one else. Jesus does not include himself in the category (nor does he include anyone else). …Since he does not include himself, it would follow that he is excluding himself from being in the category "the only true God". //

In response, I have argued that this second point of yours is a fallacious argument from silence. See my Part E, subpart (1). From the fact that Jesus did not include himself, it does not follow that he excluded himself.

Your third point was as follows:

// 3. Being that it is appositive, the grammar interchangeably allows “you [Father]” and “the only true God” as subject and predicate, which logically points to the exclusion of Jesus as the only true God (unless the Bible teaches Modalism). We may grammatically construct the appositive as (1) "The Father is the only true God" and (2) "The only true God is the Father." These constructions show that the only true God *just is* the Father: Father=the only true God; the only true God=Father. They have the form a=b and b=a. A number of Trinity theories hold the view that Jesus is (the only true) God (in addition to God the Father). However, if Jesus is God in this sense, it would follow that Jesus is identical to the Father, which the said Trinity theories deny. //

It would follow that Jesus is identical to the Father if and only if the words “you, the only true God” do in fact certainly express an absolute interchangeability between “you” (the Father) and “the only true God.” But you stated that the grammar merely “allows” this interpretation and that “we may” construe it in that way. This leads me to the point already made that unless that complete interchangeability is shown to be actually the case (rather than just a possible or plausible understanding), the text cannot be used to prove that only the Father is properly described as “true God.” Therefore, your conclusion that Trinitarian theories that hold that Jesus is “true God” imply modalism does not follow.

Your fourth point was as follows:

// 4. If Jesus being the only true God is part and parcel of knowledge of eternal life, then he missed a great opportunity to mention that one very important thing. Well, Jesus didn’t mention it. It must not be important and, for that matter, true. //

As I explained in my Part E, subsection (2), this is another argument from silence.

You concluded your opening post as follows:

// Together these considerations seem to make a cumulative case for thinking that John 17:3 excludes others—such as Jesus—as the “true God” or “the only true God”. //

Your four considerations boil down to what you acknowledged was just a possible or plausible understanding of the apposition in John 17:3 (in your first and third points) and two arguments that I explained are arguments from silence (your second and fourth points). I do not think such a collocation of four points constitutes a strong cumulative case.

If you’re going to develop a genuinely cumulative case, you’re going to need to engage potential evidence against the conclusion, especially potential evidence relatively close at hand to the evidence you think supports your conclusion. This would mean taking into account that elsewhere in the same book the author refers to Jesus Christ as “God” (John 1:1; 20:28; possibly 1:18) and that in another book the same author most likely refers to Jesus Christ as “the true God and eternal life” (1 John 5:20). Naturally, you won’t agree with me on 1 John 5:20, but I think the exegetical evidence there is quite strong, and in any case John 20:28 is virtually certain.

Aaron, I appreciate so much the kindness and respect with which you have conducted this discussion. Thank you for your friendship despite our theological differences. I would also like to say that you are one of the sharpest Unitarians whom I have encountered. I consider the time and effort involved in this exchange to have been worth it.

 

 

Does John 17:3 Exclude Others, Such as Jesus Christ, as the "True God"? Part 4

Continuing on with my exchange with Robert Bowman at Trinities Facebook group, here's part 4.

Shelenberger's Second Rejoinder and Final Remarks (March 6, 2021)

Part 1 of 9

Aaron:
//// Rob, my second and final remarks may seem unnecessarily long. But a large part of which is chunks of quotations from you and me. My intent was to provide readers a better view of the respective contexts. In addition, I wanted to respond to the things I didn't address in your first rebuttal.

To review, as you've pointed out, there are two claims:
P1. Only the Father is the true God.
P2. The Father is the only true God.

In your first rebuttal, you stated: "John 17:3 *expresses* P2, *not* P1, and orthodox Christians accept P2" (asterisks added). Then I asked if you're saying that John 17:3 *strictly* requires the P2 expression. You replied: "No, I'm saying it *need not* mean P1 but *might* mean just P2" (asterisks added). I see that you went from a hard claim to a soft one.

The reason you went that way seems to be because I brought this up: There are Monarchical Trinitarians who take John 17:3 to be expressing *both* P2 *and* the true God being one and only person, the Father, because he is the fountainhead, while they maintain the "full divinity" of the Son.

Then I said: "If you're consistent, you would also have to call this condition basically Monarchical Trinitarianism, which *does* presuppose Monarchical Trinitarianism. But then you really cannot be consistent, because the positions Monarchical Trinitarianism and Unitarianism are contradictory, so that your accusation of 'presupposing Unitarianism' would ultimately lead to self-refutation." In response to this, in your second rebuttal, you presented a dilemma. ////

Rob:
>>>> To make John 17:3 work as an objection to the Trinity, you must EITHER assume P1 *and* interpret it as excluding the Son as eternal deity (thereby presupposing Unitarianism) OR accept P2 but interpret it on the assumption that the true God is one and only one person (again presupposing Unitarianism). <<<<

Aaron:
Let's see how well the dilemma does it job. I submit that it is problematic in a number of areas. Let me for now place the dilemma aside and address your implicit assumption behind your accusation "Unitarians assume P1 without an argument".

Part 2 of 9

ASSUMING UNITARIANISM?

Well, Unitarians do have an argument for taking P1 as an expression of John 17:3, and I have presented the argument in my first rejoinder. Let me repeat it here.
I said that "from the standpoint of the way the language is used in the Bible, it does not matter where 'only' is placed. We know that the statements 'Jesus is the only begotten Son' and 'only Jesus is the begotten Son' have the same meaning in so far as 'only' is placed in the statements. In John 17:3 'only' is used as a quantifier. It is making a quantification that the 'true God' is *none* other than the Father."

You said that my example about Jesus isn't very helpful. But I pointed out that your Israel example proves my point even more: "That 'only' Jesus being God's Son does not in any way pose a problem with Israel's being God's son, precisely because of what you said: They are sons in two different senses." I didn't see a reply to this.

To repeat, I said in my first rejoinder that I'd like to hear you engage my statement: In John 17:3 "only" is used as a quantifier, which is making a quantification that the "true God" is *none* other than the Father.

You then made the following comments: "I think I did engage your statement. I showed examples where interpreting 'only' in the manner you prescribe results in contradiction. I don't think you engaged my argument in which I showed this from Genesis 7:23 and 8:9, even though you quoted it. My point was that we should 'not treat an apparent grammatical disjunction in a woodenly literal way' if doing so contradicts other biblical passages. You did not address my point about grammatical disjunction. But that is your whole case from John 17:3; without interpreting the grammatical disjunction as excluding Jesus as being true God, your use of John 17:3 as a proof text against the deity of Christ goes nowhere."

Here you might have a successful objection: A contradiction would result in my application of Bible talk on only. Let's see how effective it is.

Gen. 7:23 reads "Only Noah was left, and those that were with him in the ark." This text is clearly constructed differently compared to John 17:3: "And this is eternal life, that they know you [Father], the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent."

In Gen. 7:23, we can see the context; it's right there in front of us, and a little reading comprehension would help. Although in singular form, the word "only" is used in a collective sense. Question: Who is/are left? Answer: Noah *and* those that were with him in the ark. There is nothing else that is predicated to "those that were with him in the ark" but "only".

How about the way "only" is used in John 8:9. ESV renders the text as follows: "But when they heard it, they went away one by one, beginning with the older ones, and Jesus was left alone with [kai] the woman standing before him." ESV and some other English versions do translate kai as "with" (e.g., HCSB, NIV, NRSV, MOUNCE). Others translate it as "and" (e.g., ASV, NASB). As you know, since you're expert in Greek, this means that the Greek allows translating kai as "with" and "and".

It's remarkable that you would translate this text to say that Jesus "was left alone [monos], and [kai] the woman who as in the midst" (John 8:9b)--not that you disagree translating kai as "with"; I would hope not.

So, question: Who is/are left alone? Answer: Jesus *and* the woman; Jesus *with* the woman. Either way the context tells us that there were two left: Jesus and the woman. Similar to the way Gen. 7:23 is constructed, there's nothing else that is predicated to "the woman standing before him" but "only". For this reason, there's no "contradiction" that would result in my application of the Bible talk on only.

Moreover, I wouldn't call this approach "a woodenly simplistic grammatical analysis" (from your first rebuttal) and "an apparent grammatical disjunction in a woodenly literal way" (from your second rebuttal). Instead, I would call this a simple application of reading comprehension which strongly supports my argument: "From the standpoint of the way the language is used in the Bible, it does not matter where 'only' is placed."

But, let's assume arguendo that you're right about characterizing my approach as "a woodenly simplistic grammatical analysis". What happens then? Answer: All the talk about P1 and P2 you've been making should be relegated to the trash bin of "a woodenly simplistic grammatical analysis".

If I'm right about this, you should realize that you've wasted your precious time in trying to (1) argue, initially, that John 17:3 expresses P2, not P1, (2) argue, subsequently, that it *need not* mean P1 but *might* mean just P2 and (3) create a dilemma that leads to assuming Unitarianism.

Does my case go through? You did offer another objection to my argument, which you stated in your first rebuttal. Let's see if goes through successfully.

First, I asked: "Is there an example in the Bible where the placement of 'only' matters? I don't think there is. If there is, then that may be a game changer in the debate."
Your answered: "Perhaps there isn't, but that wouldn't matter, because (again) the logic of predication is stipulated to work somewhat differently in the unique case of God, if God is triune. In other words, the placement *probably* wouldn't matter when making predications of individual *finite beings*, but it *might* matter when making predications about one of the *divine persons* united as/in one *divine being*" (asterisks added).

I then came back with: "You're saying that, if God is triune, the logic of predication is stipulated to work somewhat differently. Is it because God is unique in that God is triune? Explain how this is. You're not saying that logic works differently when comes to God. Are you? I hope not. I would like you to be as clear as you possibly can when you explain yourself here please." But you didn't provide a response to this. I'm hoping to hear you explain your position here in your final remarks.

I also said: "You're using the words 'probably' and 'might', as though you're not sure or tentative. Care to elaborate?" Again, you didn't respond.

I don't know if you were unsure or tentative. Whatever the case maybe, I wonder how far you would go with your "finite beings" versus "divine persons united as/in one divine being" talk. Of the divine persons you referred to, I'm sure, is Jesus Christ. You believe that he is God-man, divine-human, and infinite-finite.

If we follow your line of reasoning, it would seem that the application of the Bible talk on only would apply to the finite part (man/human) of Jesus but not to his infinite part (God/divine). He declares in John 17:3, "And this is eternal life, that they know you [Father], the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent."

Jesus Christ is God-man. The Bible talk on only would apply to the "man part" of Jesus Christ, but would not apply to the "God part" of him. How would you manage to explain this?

In your third and final rebuttal, I'd really like to hear some adequate answers to these very important key questions. Until then, I think my argument on the Bible talk on only stands, and it is Trinitarian apologists who are ripping John 17:3 out of its context and out from the setting of the Bible talk on only.

Part 3 of 9

ASSUMING UNITARIANISM REPRISE

As the risk of being repetitious, let me say again that in handling John 17:3 Unitarians are not assuming Unitarianism as you and your fellow Trinitarian apologists falsely constantly make. We, Unitarians, *do* have an argument, and in our exchange I framed the argument (and provided details), namely: "From the standpoint of the way the language is used in the Bible, it does not matter where 'only' is placed."

Now, Rob, in your constant auto-accusation of "assuming Unitarianism," you have continually mischaracterized what Unitarians are doing: You are conflating the *method* (basis) with the *content* of the view--the method and basis being the application of the way the Bible uses the word only; the content being Unitarianism.

Let's just say that my argument does not go through, because you've somehow shown it to be unsuccessful. Fine. That does not mean I have no argument; neither does it mean I'm assuming Unitarianism; only that my argument fails.
An illustration might be helpful. Trinity theories can be divided in a number of ways. In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Dale Tuggy identifies a number of them. Of which the two main ones are what he calls one-self theory (or anti-social Trinitarianism, e.g., Latin Trinitarianism so-called by Brian Leftow) and three-self theory (or social Trinitarianism).

Of the latter there are number of sub-theories. One sub-theory is Trinity Monotheism authored (?) by William Lane Craig. Another is Relative Identity theory with yet a number of sub-theories under it.

Pertaining to the Relative Identity theory Tuggy explains, "Why can’t multiple divine selves be one and the same god? It would seem that by being the same god, they must be numerically the same entity; 'they' are really one, and so 'they' can’t differ in any way (that is, this one entity can’t differ from itself). But then, they (really: it) can’t be different divine selves. Relative identity theorists think there is some mistake in this reasoning, so that things may be different somethings yet the same something else. They hold that the above reasoning falsely *assumes* something about numerical sameness. They hold that numerical sameness, or identity, either can be or always is relative to a kind or concept" (asterisks added). (Source: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/trinity/)
Why am I bringing all this up? To drive a very important point about the auto-accusation of assuming Unitarianism from many Trinitarian apologists.

A Relative Identity Trinitarian may accuse a Latin Trinitarian, as Leftow, of assuming Latin Trinitarianism. He may also accuse a Social Trinitarian, as Craig, of assuming Trinity Monotheism. But such an accusation is clearly a wrong move on the part of the Relative Identity Trinitarian: He is conflating the method with the content. (Now, I highly doubt that a Relative Identity Trinitarian trained in logic and philosophy would do such a thing.)
The method may be a wrong tool or approach to use, and the content might be false; but to accuse the individual of assuming Latin Trinitarianism or Trinity Monotheism would be a wrong way to see the problem. The Relative Identity Trinitarian should, instead, be attacking the assumption on the part of Leftow and Craig as to how these two philosophers are a falsely assuming something about numerical sameness, not that they are *assuming* their own respective Trinity theories.

Similarly, you should be attacking my methodology (namely, drawing from my understanding of the Bible's usage of 'only') in arriving at the content (Unitarianism). You shouldn't be accusing me of assuming Unitarianism, because I'm not. I might very well be using a wrong method or basis (whether or not Unitarianism is false). If I am doing so, then fine. My problem would then primarily be methodological. But you would have to show this, which you believe you have done; but of course I don't think you have, as can be seen in my response above.

Lastly, let me address your mischaracterization from another angle. Your accusation sounds like this: "Aaron, you're assuming Unitarianism, because you're assuming that your argument for Unitarianism is successful." Well, of course! As you know full well, that's just how things work in the discipline of reasoning and argumentation. What is stopping me from saying to you: "Rob, you're assuming Trinitarianism, because you're assuming that your argument for Trinitarianism is successful"?

Part 4 or 9

DOES THE DILEMMA DO ITS JOB?

Let me now, finally, get back to addressing the dilemma you presented. You wrote: "To make John 17:3 work as an objection to the Trinity, you must EITHER assume P1 *and* interpret it as excluding the Son as eternal deity (thereby presupposing Unitarianism) OR accept P2 but interpret it on the assumption that the true God is one and only one person (again presupposing Unitarianism)."

It seems to me that if you're successful here, you are justified in saying that Unitarians are presupposing Unitarianism in either case. Let me address each horn. Then I will present a third horn, which I think has a neutralizing effect on the dilemma you presented.

FIRST HORN OF BOWMAN'S DILEMMA

The first horn says, "assume P1 *and* interpret it as excluding the Son as eternal deity (thereby presupposing Unitarianism)." Well, the same Monarchical Trinitarians (I discussed) do assume P1 *and* interpret it as excluding the Son from being "the only true God" with the understanding that "true" is not to be contrasted with "false" but instead expresses how the Father is personally distinct from the Son and the Spirit.

Does this, thereby, mean that those Monarchical Trinitarians are presupposing Monarchical Trinitarianism? Your answer would have to be yes, if you're consistent. For this reason, the first horn of the dilemma would cut both ways, although it may not necessarily affect your own Trinity theory; I would have to learn more about your theory to make an informed judgment. (Now, I wonder if you'll bring this up if ever you do have a dialogue with Monarchical Trinitarians. I think you should, given your belief that your Trinity theory is closer to the Bible than theirs.)

Let's say you're consistent. Would your accusation of "presupposing Unitarianism" stick? I don't think so. The first part of the first horn says that I must "assume P1". If you mean "assume" without an argument, that again, Rob, is a mischaracterization of what "assume P1" means. So, I reject what you mean here.

I do have an argument (the Bible talk on 'only'), and I went at great length above in laying out that argument and refuting your counters. I believe I've managed to show (1) that what you may call "a woodenly simplistic grammatical analysis" is merely "a simple application of reading comprehension" and (2) that even while assuming you're right about my approach as "a woodenly simplistic grammatical analysis," it would follow that all the talk about P1 and P2 you've been making should be relegated to the trash bin of "a woodenly simplistic grammatical analysis".

It now appears that before your dilemma can even take off the ground, you'd have to fix the first part of the first horn ('assume P1'). The way to fix the broken horn is you'd have to successfully demonstrate that my argument fails. Until then, there is no first horn of the dilemma that could perform the job that you want it to.

At this juncture, here's how the first "horn" has turned into: "Assume--with a successful argument--and hence accept P1 *and* interpret it as excluding the Son as eternal deity (thereby *establishing* that Unitarianism is not presupposed)."

But let's just say that my argument does fail in establishing P1. What happens then? Well, there would be no P1 to be assumed (and accepted), much less interpreted as excluding the Son as eternal deity. The so-called "presupposing Unitarianism" wouldn't even happen. Stop this auto-accusation of "assuming Unitarianism" nonsense already!

Part 5 of 9

SECOND HORN OF BOWMAN'S DILEMMA

Let me now turn to the second horn of the dilemma, which says "accept P2 but interpret it on the assumption that the true God is one and only one person (again presupposing Unitarianism)." P2 states: "The Father is the only true God."

On the one hand, as shown above, the broken part of the first horn is "assume P1". On the other, as will be shown, the broken part of the second is "interpret it on the *assumption* that the true God is one and only one person." Similar to the first horn, there are two problems with the second one.

First, the same Monarchical Trinitarians do accept P2 but interpret it on the *assumption* that the true God is one and only one person, the Father, with the understanding that "true" is not to be contrasted with "false" but instead expresses how the Father is personally distinct from the Son and the Spirit. Does this mean that those Monarchical Trinitarians are presupposing Monarchical Trinitarianism? Your answer would have to be yes, if you're consistent. For this reason, the second horn of the dilemma would cut both ways, although it may not necessarily affect your own Trinity theory.

Again, let's say you're consistent. Would your accusation of "presupposing Unitarianism" stick? I think not. If you mean by "assumption" without an argument, you are sorely mistaken, sir; this is the same mistake you've committed in the first horn.

By now you should realize that I would simply go back and remind you of my argument for interpreting P2 based on the Bible talk on only and what I think this argument did to your counter (your 'a woodenly simplistic grammatical analysis' is merely 'a simple application of reading comprehension', and it would mean that all the talk about P1 and P2 you've been making should be relegated to the trash bin of 'a woodenly simplistic grammatical analysis').
At this juncture, you now have two broken horns in your hands, Rob. And it gets worse, for here's how the second "horn" has turned into: "Accept P2 but interpret it on the assumption that--with a successful argument--the true God is one and only one person (*establishing* Unitarianism is not presupposed).

I don't need to bring up the fact that even if my argument--in interpreting P2 to mean that the true God is one and only one person--does fail, the so-called "presupposing Unitarianism" wouldn't even happen. Again, stop this constant auto-accusation of "assuming Unitarianism" nonsense already! And please tell your fellow Trinitarian apologists to do the same.

Par 6 of 9

A POSSIBLE THIRD HORN

Let's first have a review of the two claims.
P1: Only the Father is the true God.
P2: The Father is the only true God.

Turning now to a third horn I promised early on: "Assume P3 *and* accept it as excluding the Son as eternal deity (again *establishing* that Unitarianism is not presupposed). What is P3?

Recall the third consideration in my OP. Being that it is appositive, the grammar of John 17:3 allows “you [Father]” and “the only true God” as subject and predicate interchangeably, which points to the exclusion of Jesus as the only true God. From the grammar we may construct the appositive as (1) "The Father is the only true God" and (2) "The only true God is the Father." Together, these constructions show that the only true God *just is* the Father: Father=the only true God; the only true God=Father. They have the form a=b and b=a.

I submit that "The only true God is the Father" can logically be converted to "Only the Father is the only true God," so that the two statements have logical equivalence. For the sake of our readers, there are three steps to the process. First, add "all of" at the beginning of the statement; next, switch the place of the subject and predicate; lastly, replace "all of" with "only". The result is "Only the Father is the only true God". We may now have a third claim as to what John 17:3 expresses.
P3: Only the Father is the only true God.

Let's just back up a bit. In your first rebuttal you characterized my treatment of the appositive as "an overly cut-and-dried, wooden understanding of apposition." You continued "I thought I explained this to you not long ago and you conceded the point, backing down to the softer claim that the apposition *could* be interpreted in a completely interchangeable manner, not that it 'logically' must be."

I then replied saying that I didn't see anywhere that I conceded the point and that I was still maintaining that the appositive merely *allows* the interchangeability of "Father" and "the only true God" as subject and predicate, not that it *logically* must be. I continued "I see no restriction to this. You would need to provide an argument why P2 (The Father is the only true God) is *strictly* the required expression of John 17:3, if this is your position." (This is because in your first rebuttal you stated that John 17:3 *expresses* P2, *not* P1, and orthodox Christians accept P2.) Then after I pressed if you're saying that John 17:3 *strictly* requires the P2 expression, you replied in your second rebuttal stating that it *need not* mean P1 but *might* mean just P2. So, you went from a hard claim to a soft one.

Again, I don't claim that the said interchangeability is a necessity. I only claim that the grammar allows it. As shown, P3 is established from the appositive found in John 17:3, the allowable interchangeability, and a logical conversion. To repeat what you claimed: John 17:3 *need not* mean P1 but *might* mean just P2. I would just say that John 17:3 *could* mean P3. It could also mean both P1 and P2. I see no competition amongst these three claims. In fact, they complement one another as part and parcel of the cumulative case presented in my OP.

So, here again is the third horn: "Assume P3 *and* accept it as excluding the Son as eternal deity (again *establishing* that Unitarianism is not presupposed)." P3 is an assumption with an argument. The best you can do is attempt to tear down the argument under girding P3. Your success in tearing it down will surely preclude you from pressing the auto-accusation button of assuming Unitarianism, that is, if you want to be reasonable about it.

Part 7 of 9

SECOND CONSIDERATION

Some remarks are in order pertaining to the second consideration in my OP. I argued that the only person Jesus places in the category “the only true God” is the Father—no one else. Jesus does not include himself in the category (nor does he include anyone else). He does not say “that they know you [Father] *and me* [Jesus Christ], the only true God”. Since he does not include himself, it would follow that he is excluding himself from being in the category "the only true God".

You accused me of committing "a blatant argument from silence" and that it "can be restated as follows:
p1. He did not include himself.
c. Therefore, he excluded himself.
We can restate this even more formally as follows:
p1. 'Christ is included' is not stated in John 17:3.
c. Therefore, 'Christ is included' is not true."
You then explained that an "argument from silence fallaciously draws an inference from the fact that something is not stated in a particular context. The argument takes the following form:
p1. 'X' is not stated at point y.
c. Therefore, 'X' is not true."

Early on, I raised two very important questions on the matter.
1. When Jesus says "you [Father] the only true God," does he exclude *anyone* at all from the category "the only true God"?
2. Who does Jesus include in that category?

To which you answered: "He excluded anyone that would claim or be viewed as a different God than the one true God. His statement only specifically included the Father, but my whole point is that his statement should not be interpreted to exclude other divine persons who share with the Father in the category of being truly God."

Rob, I don't think I'm guilty of an argument from silence. You painted a caricature of my argument. My argument does not fallaciously draw an inference from the fact that something is *not* stated in the context. Rather, it draws an inference from the fact that something is *implied* by what *is* stated in the context. My argument can correctly be restated as follows.
P1. He included only the Father, and not himself and others.
C. Therefore, he excluded himself and others.

Most people do seem to take for granted that that which is not included is excluded, which by itself can be an argument from silence, depending on the context. But my argument doesn't commit this fallacy. As can be seen in the restatement, the words "only" and "did not include" bring out the implication of *exclusivity*. When I asked you the two questions above, you replied stating that Jesus *excluded* "anyone that would claim or be viewed as a different God than the one true God" and that his "statement only specifically included the Father."

Now, how in the world did you manage to draw "excluded" from what Jesus declared in John 17:3 which reads: “And this is eternal life, that they know you [Father], the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent”? You don't see "excluded" there. It is not stated. Does this mean you're guilty of "a blatant argument from silence"? It would appear so.

If indeed you're guilt of it, then your accusation cuts both ways. But then the blade really doesn't cut both ways, because I provided a good reason why my argument isn't that. For this reason, the second consideration in my OP stands.

So, how did you manage to draw "excluded" from the text without committing a blatant argument from silence? I think one way you could avoid committing the fallacy is simply to admit that the words "you [Father] the only true God" imply exclusivity, even though "exclude" is not stated there, unless you have a better idea.

Part 8 of 9

FOURTH CONSIDERATION

Let me discuss the fourth consideration in my OP. I said that I maintain that if Christ being the only true God--too, in addition to the Father--is part and parcel of knowledge of eternal life, then he missed a great opportunity to mention that one very important information. Well, he didn’t mention it. It must not be important and, for that matter, true.

You replied: "Your argument is an argument from silence (This text does not say 'X,' therefore 'X' must not be true). There is no 'discussion' in John 17 about the Father being the only true God. This fact is stated briefly as just part of a single sentence." I think this is a fair point. But hear me out.

I don't think it is an argument from silence. I would call it an argument from extreme importance. For you, the following is an extremely important and non-negotiable aspect of Christianity: Part and parcel of *knowledge* of eternal life is Jesus being God in the same sense as the Father is.

In other words, in order to attain eternal life one must accept and hence have knowledge of Jesus being God. Yet, for you, "knowledge" of that which is *extremely* important and *non-negotiable* was not important *enough* to be mentioned by Jesus in John 17:3 or anywhere within the immediate context of the text.

On the other hand, I think that, if it is *that* important, we would expect Jesus to mention it *and* be direct about it. To me, that Jesus didn't do any of the sort *renders* the prior probability of Jesus being God extremely low. Not that Jesus being God is impossible (or that it is absolutely not true); only that it is extremely unlikely to begin with, given the *supposed* high importance of such an information that Trinitarians have placed upon it *and* Jesus not mentioning it in any manner at all anywhere in the text or the immediate context.

By "prior probability" I mean *before* we look at other relevant biblical passages that might point to Jesus being God. For this reason, in order to overcome this extremely low prior, it would require Trinitarians to provide a good amount of biblical data and support.

I think it gets worse. The prior probability of Jesus being God is further lowered when my fourth consideration is combined with the other considerations in my OP. Above, I went at great length in expounding them and refuting your counters.

Now, in my humble opinion, the data and support that you and J. Ed Komoszewski provided in your book "Putting Jesus in His Place: The Case for the Deity of Christ" do not amount to Jesus being God. But that is another discussion altogether.

Part 9 of 9

CONCLUSION

I wanted say more, but this is getting too long. LOL! Have I been able to make a good case? In my OP, I wrote at the end: "Together these considerations seem to make a cumulative case for thinking that John 17:3 excludes others—such as Jesus—as the 'true God' or 'the only true God'". Notice that I used the word *seem*. I was trying to be modest.

Thus far, I believe that I've been able to make a good case based on four considerations as they stand together and in view of the refutations I provided. To be sure, I have to wait for your final remarks to see if my case stands.

I would rather maintain this: It is not enough for Unitarians, like myself, to use John 17:3 and a handful of other Bible verses to establish Unitarianism. Using a few verses is proof-texting. It is taking those verses in isolation and deciding ahead of time that Unitarianism is biblical based merely on those few verses. Needless to say, this approach is not considering other relevant biblical data that might sound like Jesus is God in the same sense as the Father is.

Let's assume that I did make a good case. At best, this renders the prior probability that Unitarianism is biblical, not that it completely establishes the doctrine as biblical. For, to that end, we would also need to consider the said relevant biblical data that might sound like Jesus is God. If we are able to successfully demonstrate that the data are compatible with Unitarianism--that is, among other considerations, if those data fail to amount to Jesus being God--then the doctrine of Unitarianism is established as biblical.

CLOSING

Rob, I consider this dialogue to be both an honor and a privilege. You are a prominent, well seasoned and well respected Trinitarian apologist. You, sir, have raised a number of things for me to think about.

Thank you for your time, effort and patience. Thank you for allowing me to publish this exchange on my blog, even though it was a last minute request on my part after your second rebuttal. Prior arrangements may have allowed you to better prepare to be able to provide better responses in your first and second rebuttals. But in your final rebuttal, I would ask that you be as brutally critical as you possibly can, yet with gentleness, meekness and charity of course. 🙂 Your input will surely be very useful for further studies by readers from both the Unitarian and non-Unitarian camps.

Perhaps we could do this again some other time with prior arrangements, if time permits. I'm looking forward to the second edition of your and J. Ed's book "Putting Jesus". Maybe, just maybe, you'll find some material discussed in our exchange useful for possible consideration to your book.

As agreed upon, you have the last word, sir. Please take the floor. God bless you and your family!

Does John 17:3 Exclude Others, Such as Jesus Christ, as the "True God"? Part 3

Here's part 3 of the exchange with Bowman's second rebuttal.

Bowman's Second Rebuttal (February 27, 2021)

Aaron, as I've stated before, I don't have time for protracted exchanges on FB (not just here, but in any FB group).

I had written: Please take into advisement that over this entire post should be a disclaimer that I do not agree that working out the semantic and philosophical issues inherent in this particular line of argument is essential to the orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation.

You asked:
/// Why is that? Could you please expand on this. ///

I already did so in my first post in this thread, where I explained what I maintain is the proper method, over against the method of pounding on the same few proof texts over and over.

You asked:
/// Are you saying that John 17:3 *strictly* requires the P2 expression? ///

No, I'm saying it need not mean P1 but might mean just P2.

To make John 17:3 work as an objection to the Trinity, you must EITHER assume P1 *and* interpret it as excluding the Son as eternal deity (thereby presupposing Unitarianism) OR accept P2 but interpret it on the assumption that the true God is one and only one person (again presupposing Unitarianism). Those Trinitarians who view the Father alone as autotheos because he is neither begotten nor proceeding can accept P1 but then argue that "true" here is not to be contrasted with "false" but instead expresses how the Father is personally distinct from the Son and the Spirit. Their position is arguably the classic, patristic position. All I'm arguing is that John 17:3 can also be interpreted in such a way that it does not exclude the Son from being "true God" if we understand that expression to mean truly deity in contrast to false gods (which I maintain is a more biblical way of understanding the expression).

You wrote:
/// I'd like to hear you engage my statement: In John 17:3 "only" is used as a quantifier. It is making a quantification that the "true God" is *none* other than the Father. //

I think I did engage your statement. I showed examples where interpreting "only" in the manner you prescribe results in contradiction. I don't think you engaged my argument in which I showed this from Genesis 7:23 and 8:9, even though you quoted it. My point was that we should "not treat an apparent grammatical disjunction in a woodenly literal way" if doing so contradicts other biblical passages. You did not address my point about grammatical disjunction. But that is your whole case from John 17:3; without interpreting the grammatical disjunction as excluding Jesus as being true God, your use of John 17:3 as a proof text against the deity of Christ goes nowhere.

My position is simply this: There is only one true God, and the "quantifier" in that statement is "one," not "only." I affirm that whatever is truly God is properly described as "the only true God" because there is no other God than the only true God. Thus, I affirm that the Father is the only true God. I just don't interpret this so as to deny what John himself says elsewhere about the Son/Word/Jesus being (truly) God.

You wrote:
/// Why would I want to limit God? God is God, and I am not. ///

I agree. And I would not want to limit God to being unipersonal on the basis of isolated proof texts.

You wrote:
/// Now, wait just a minute! If Christ is "the only true God" too (just like the Father) why wait for the Father to exalt him at the proper time? If Christ is "the only true God" too (just like the Father), then he's already up there equal with the Father as "the only true God". ///

I explained why later, and you didn't address my explanation. Instead, you quoted it back to me with "only true God" inserted several times and asked me, "And this is what you offer as an explanation of why Jesus did not mention his being the one true God?" How about you just address the explanation as I presented it?

"Exalt" here is honor-culture language for a person of authority honoring someone, not metaphysical language for someone becoming something he was not by nature previously.

I did address your "Donald Trump" argument. I pointed out that God is not a finite being (as is Trump).

You had written:
/// Since he does not include himself, it would follow that he is excluding himself from being in the category "the only true God". ///

I pointed out that your statement here was "a blatant argument from silence." You replied:
/// Rather than calling it "a blatant argument from silence" I'd like to hear you provide a reason why it's that. ///

Really? Do I really need to spell it out?

Here's your statement again:
/// Since he does not include himself, it would follow that he is excluding himself from being in the category "the only true God". ///

Your argument can be restated as follows:
p1. He did not include himself.
c. Therefore, he excluded himself.

We can restate this even more formally as follows:
p1. 'Christ is included' is not stated in John 17:3.
c. Therefore, 'Christ is included' is not true.

That's precisely the form of an argument from silence, Aaron. An argument from silence fallaciously draws an inference from the fact that something is not stated in a particular context. The argument takes the following form:
p1. 'X' is not stated at point y.
c. Therefore, 'X' is not true.

That's your argument! It's an argument from silence.

I didn't quote the rest of your comment on this point because you merely restated the same argument in several ways.

You wrote:
/// Let me ask you: When Jesus said "you [Father] the only true God," does he exclude *anyone* at all from the category "the only true God"? Who does Jesus include in that category? ///

He excluded anyone that would claim or be viewed as a different God than the one true God. His statement only specifically included the Father, but my whole point is that his statement should not be interpreted to exclude other divine persons who share with the Father in the category of being truly God.

/// I don't see anywhere here that I conceded the point. I'm still maintaining that the appositive allows the interchangeability of "Father" and "the only true God" as subject and predicate. I see no restriction to this. You would need to provide an argument why P2 (The Father is the only true God) is *strictly* the required expression of John 17:3, if this is your position. ///

I'm not using John 17:3 in an attempt to disprove your position. The burden of proof is on you, not on me. You must show not just that the appositive allows such interchangeability but that it *requires* it. To answer your objection, all I need do is to show that the appositive does *not* necessarily require such interchangeability.

You wrote:
/// I agree that no single biblical text captures all the important truths to be known, and here you are strawmanning: I never said that a text has to state explicitly everything that would be considered important to know. John 17:3 says nothing about the atonement or the resurrection, because the atonement or the resurrection are not under discussion in the text. But "the Father" being "the only true God" and "Jesus Christ" being "sent by the Father" and "knowledge of these two" being "eternal life" are under discussion in John 17:3. For this reason, I maintain that if Christ being the only true God--too, in addition to the Father--is part and parcel of knowledge of eternal life, then he missed a great opportunity to mention that one very important thing; well, he didn’t mention it; it must not be important and, for that matter, true. ///

My objection to your argument was not a straw man, because my point was that Jesus did not need to address every issue relevant to what is involved in us having eternal life. Nor did he need to comment specifically on his own divine status in that particular sentence. Your argument is an argument from silence (This text does not say 'X,' therefore 'X' must not be true).

There is no "discussion" in John 17 about the Father being the only true God. This fact is stated briefly as just part of a single sentence. Now, if Jesus had been claiming to give a lecture on the nature of deity and the relations among the divine persons, we would have expected him to talk about his own deity as well as that of the Holy Spirit. But that's not the subject of John 17.

I think that covers most of what you said.

Does John 17:3 Exclude Others, Such as Jesus Christ, as the "True God"? Part 2

Here's my first rejoinder to Bowman’s first rebuttal.

Shelenberger's First Rejoinder (February 27, 2021)

Part 1 of 4

Rob:

>>> Please take into advisement that over this entire post should be a disclaimer that I do not agree that working out the semantic and philosophical issues inherent in this particular line of argument is essential to the orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation. <<<

 

Aaron:

/// Why is that? Could you please expand on this. ///

 

Rob:

>>> As I've explained before, and as you seem to anticipate, there is a difference between the following two claims:

P1. Only the Father is the true God.

P2. The Father is the only true God.

John 17:3 expresses P2, not P1, and orthodox Christians accept P2. <<<

 

Aaron:

/// Are you saying that John 17:3 *strictly* requires the P2 expression? ///

 

Rob:

>>> Now, some orthodox Christians do accept P1, but my point stands that these are not necessarily the same proposition. P1 means that the Father is the only member of the class "true God"; P2 means that the class "true God" is a class that excludes all false gods and that the Father is properly described as belonging to that class. To put it another way, "the only true God" is simply a more expansive designation for "God," so that there really is no difference between saying "the Father is God" and "the Father is the only true God." Now, I would agree that P2 would exclude Jesus as true God *if* the true God is one and only one person, the Father. However, that condition is basically Unitarianism. In short, yes, your argument *does* presuppose Unitarianism. <<<

 

Aaron:

/// From what I understand, there are Monarchical Trinitarians (and maybe Nicene Trinitarians?) who take John 17:3 to be expressing *both* P2 *and* the true God being one and only person, the Father, because he is the fountainhead of God, while they maintain the "full divinity" (whatever this means) of the Son, Jesus Christ.

If you're consistent, you would also have to call this condition basically Monarchical Trinitarianism, which *does* presuppose Monarchical Trinitarianism. But then you really cannot be consistent, because the positions Monarchical Trinitarianism and Unitarianism are contradictory, so that your accusation of "presupposing Unitarianism" would ultimately lead to self-refutation.

 

You're admitting that "some orthodox Christians do accept P1". I see. Could those specific "orthodox Christians" be Monarchical Trinitarian? I'm curious: Who are you referring to specifically? Now, from talking to the said Monarchical Trinitarians, they seem to assume that the placement of "only" does not matter, and for that they affirm both P1 and P2 to be expressions of John 17:3.

 

In any case, no it doesn't presuppose Unitarianism, because as I've stated in my OP the way the language is used in the Bible, it does not matter where "only" is placed. But you are disputing this claim. Let's see how your comeback holds. ///

 

Part 2 of 4

Aaron:

// But from the standpoint of the way the language is used in the Bible, it does not matter where "only" is placed. We know that the statements “Jesus is the only begotten Son” and “only Jesus is the begotten Son” have the same meaning in so far as “only” is placed in the statements. In John 17:3 "only" is used as a quantifier. It is making a quantification that the "true God" is *none* other than the Father. //

Rob:

>>> Your example isn't a very helpful one, because "only begotten" actually translated one word, not two, and it means something like "unique/only child" (context matters as far as the precise sense). "Jesus is the monogenes Son" is a true proposition, and yes, it entails that only Jesus is the Son specifically described as monogenes. "Only Jesus is the Son of God" is arguably not a true proposition, because (for example) Israel is God's son in a different sense. <<<

 

Aaron:

/// I'd like to hear you engage my statement: In John 17:3 "only" is used as a quantifier. It is making a quantification that the "true God" is *none* other than the Father.

I think my example does its job in making a point about the placement of "only". Your Israel example proves my point even more. That "only" Jesus being God's Son does not in any way pose a problem with Israel's being God's son, precisely because of what you said: They are sons in two different senses. ///

.

.

.

Aaron:

// Is there an example in the Bible where the placement of "only" matters? I don't think there is. If there is, then that may be a game changer in the debate. //

 

Rob:

>>> Perhaps there isn't, but that wouldn't matter, because (again) the logic of predication is stipulated to work somewhat differently in the unique case of God, if God is triune. <<<

 

Aaron:

/// You're saying that, if God is triune, the logic of predication is stipulated to work somewhat differently. Is it because God is unique in that God is triune? Explain how this is. You're not saying that logic works differently when comes to God. Are you? I hope not. I would like you to be as clear as you possibly can when you explain yourself here please. ///

 

Rob:

>>> In other words, the placement probably wouldn't matter when making predications of individual finite beings, but it might matter when making predications about one of the divine persons united as/in one divine being. <<<

 

Aaron:

/// You're using the words "probably" and "might", as though you're not sure or tentative. Care to elaborate? ///

 

Rob:

>>> Perhaps more relevant is the fact that there are biblical texts that use the word "only" in which, if you applied the same reasoning as you are using here, we would have to conclude that the text is self-contradictory. I'll give you two examples.

After the Flood, according to Genesis, “Only Noah was left, and those that were with him in the ark” (Gen. 7:23). The Septuagint translation uses the word monos, as in John 17:3. From a woodenly simplistic grammatical analysis, it may appear that “those who were with him in the ark” are distinguished from the “only” one who “was left” (the verb is in the singular form, indicating literally that only one person was left). But such an inference is clearly contrary to the intent of the statement as a whole in context. The statement singles out Noah as the one who “alone” was left alive after the Flood, yet its intended meaning is clearly not to exclude “those that were with him in the ark” as also having survived.

The same idiomatic way of speaking occurs in the passage about the woman caught in adultery, which says that Jesus “was left alone [monos], and [kai] the woman who was in the midst” (John 8:9, my translation). (I agree with the consensus of biblical scholars that John 7:53-8:11 is not part of the original Gospel of John, but it does show how Greek writers of the period used such language, which is all that matters here.)

The point is that one must consider what is actually being said in context and not treat an apparent grammatical disjunction in a woodenly literal way. <<<

Aaron:

/// As I've stated again and again, I certainly agree that we cannot take a verse or two in isolation. We must take the whole counsel of God, the Bible, into consideration and account for all the relevant texts. ///

 

Rob:

>>> The same caution also applies to John 17:3 (although it is not using precisely the same idiom as the above two texts). The verse affirms that eternal life consists in knowing the Father and Jesus Christ. Now this is a startling statement if Christ is just a creature, no matter how great. <<<

 

Aaron:

/// At one level it is startling to me, for how could God possibly make a mere creature, as the man Christ Jesus (1 Tim. 2:5), be that great?

At another level it shouldn't be startling to me (and it isn't), because I believe that God is *powerful enough* to exalt this man to the highest status, making him Lord (Phil. 2:8-11). Why would I want to limit God? God is God, and I am not. ///

 

Rob:

>>> Eternal life is all about knowing God—that is, about having a relationship with him in which we know him personally, in which we enjoy life with him forever. John 17:3 expands this observation to say that eternal life consists in knowing both the Father and Jesus Christ. <<<

 

Aaron:

/// Amen! And to clarify, eternal life consists in knowing both the Father the only true God and Jesus Christ whom the Father sent. ///

 

Rob:

>>> In this context, Christ’s reference to his Father as “the only true God” does not exclude himself from that status. Rather, Christ is honoring the Father as God while trusting the Father to exalt him at the proper time. Thus, Jesus immediately goes on to affirm that he had devoted his time on earth to glorifying the Father (v. 4) and to ask the Father in turn to glorify him (v. 5). <<<

 

Aaron:

/// Now, wait just a minute! If Christ is "the only true God" too (just like the Father) why wait for the Father to exalt him at the proper time? If Christ is "the only true God" too (just like the Father), then he's already up there equal with the Father as "the only true God".

If you come back with "Well, the doctrine of the Incarnation holds that Christ the God-man was to be exalted at the proper time" or something to that effect, it still wouldn't solve the problem, because there is the "God" part (in 'God'-man) that's already exalted that doesn't require exaltation. ///

 

Part 3 of 4

Aaron:

// Some might comeback with: “You are assuming Unitarianism in order to prove Unitarianism.” No I’m not. I’m merely applying the way the Bible talks, and we even the modern readers intuitively and naturally apply the same way of talking in our day-to-day conversation with others. // 

 

Rob:

>>> I think I've shown that yes, you are assuming Unitarianism, because you are assuming that the language of predication used of God works in the same way as when used about finite beings "in our day-to-day conversation with others." <<<

 

Aaron:

/// This is not assuming Unitarianism. This is assuming and applying the way the Bible talks. You’re conflating the two. So, no you haven't shown me that I'm assuming Unitarianism.

 

First, to illustrate my application of the way the Bible talks, I provided an example of Donald Trump being the only true President, which you did not address in your reply. If Trump is the only true President, then no one else is. No one else is what? "true President". Similarly, if the Father is the only true God, then no one else is. No one else is what? "true God". To be clear, the language doesn't just exclude Christ; it excludes others who are not the Father.

 

Second, you're conflating the two things I said: (1) "I’m merely applying the way the Bible talks." I expanded this by providing an example of Jesus being the only begotten Son of God and only Jesus being the begotten Son of God. (See my further reply on this.) I also asked if there's any biblical example in which the placement of "only" matters, to which you answered "Perhaps there isn't". (See my further reply on this.) The very admittance that there *isn't* a biblical example itself supports what I think the way the Bible talks. For this reason alone, I'm not assuming Unitarianism.

 

(2) I also said that we *even* the modern readers intuitively and naturally apply the same way of talking in our day-to-day conversation with others. This was only meant to be a confirmation of the way the Bible places "only" in the way it talks.

Third, see my post above that this accusation of yours would I think ultimately lead to self-refutation on your part. ///

 

Rob:

>>> Also, I've given some evidence that "the way the Bible talks" sometimes runs counter to what "modern readers intuitively and naturally" expect. <<<

 

Aaron:

/// I do agree that Bible talks do sometime go against modern readers' intuition. But the "evidence" you provided do not, at all, have any negative effect on my position. ///

.

.

.

Aaron:

// 2. ...Since he does not include himself, it would follow that he is excluding himself from being in the category "the only true God". //

 

Rob:

>>> No, that does not follow at all. That's a blatant argument from silence. <<<

 

Aaron:

/// Rather than calling it "a blatant argument from silence" I'd like to hear you provide a reason why it's that. Besides, you took a small part of what I said and left a big chunk. Let me repost the whole thing with some emphasis, and I ask that you engage it.

Let's go strictly with "you [Father], the only true God,” so that we have the statement “The Father is the only true God”.

According to the text, the ONLY PERSON Jesus places in the category “the only true God” is the Father—no one else. Jesus does NOT INCLUDE HIMSELF in the category (NOR does he include ANYONE ELSE). (Sorry. I'm not yelling, only emphasizing.) Jesus does not say “that they know you [Father] *AND ME* [Jesus Christ], the only true God”. Since he does not include himself, it would follow that he is excluding himself from being in the category "the only true God".

Let me ask you: When Jesus said "you [Father] the only true God," does he exclude *anyone* at all from the category "the only true God"? Who does Jesus include in that category? ///

.

.

.

Aaron:

// 3. Being that it is appositive, the grammar interchangeably allows “you [Father]” and “the only true God” as subject and predicate, which logically points to the exclusion of Jesus as the only true God (unless the Bible teaches Modalism).

We may grammatically construct the appositive as (1) "The Father is the only true God" and (2) "The only true God is the Father." These constructions show that the only true God *just is* the Father: Father=the only true God; the only true God=Father. They have the form a=b and b=a. //

 

Rob:

>>> I'm starting to wonder how many times I need to answer this argument. That's an overly cut-and-dried, wooden understanding of apposition. I thought I explained this to you not long ago and you conceded the point, backing down to the softer claim that the apposition *could* be interpreted in a completely interchangeable manner, not that it "logically" must be, <<<

 

Aaron:

/// There's an OP by Bobby Glen Thomas (2/20/21) in this forum under which you posted: "Apposition can be used for description or for further identification or specification; it does not automatically or invariably express complete interchangeability in all contexts."

To which I replied: "I agree. What I would like to hear you acknowledge is that the grammar itself, at least, *allows* such an interchangeability. Of course, grammar all by itself does not decide. And yes everything that the Bible says needs to be taken into account."

Then you replied: "Aaron, if all you want to claim is that there *could* be complete interchangeability between appositional elements, depending on context and all relevant information being considered, you've got my support. Up to now, whenever I've seen this issue raised by Unitarians, Jehovah's Witnesses, et. al., they have made a strong claim that the grammar requires us to understand John 17:3 in such a way that Jesus Christ is absolutely excluded from being recognized in other statements as truly God."

I don't see anywhere here that I conceded the point. I'm still maintaining that the appositive allows the interchangeability of "Father" and "the only true God" as subject and predicate. I see no restriction to this. You would need to provide an argument why P2 (The Father is the only true God) is *strictly* the required expression of John 17:3, if this is your position. ///

 

Part 4 of 4

Aaron:

// 4. If Jesus being the only true God is part and parcel of knowledge of eternal life, then he missed a great opportunity to mention that one very important thing. Well, Jesus didn’t mention it. It must not be important and, for that matter, true. //

 

Rob:

>>> Hence my stipulation in my first response to you in this thread:

"Avoid begging the question by assuming, for example, that if the NT writers wanted to teach 'X' they would have worded it in such-and-such a manner, or they would have mentioned it in this or that place."

The claim that if something was important it would have been mentioned in this or that specific text runs afoul of the fact that probably no one text or passage explicitly states everything that would be considered important to know. For example, John 17:3 says nothing about the atonement or the resurrection. It's just bad reasoning. <<<

 

Aaron:

/// I agree that no single biblical text captures all the important truths to be known, and here you are strawmanning: I never said that a text has to state explicitly everything that would be considered important to know. John 17:3 says nothing about the atonement or the resurrection, because the atonement or the resurrection are not under discussion in the text. But "the Father" being "the only true God" and "Jesus Christ" being "sent by the Father" and "knowledge of these two" being "eternal life" are under discussion in John 17:3. For this reason, I maintain that if Christ being the only true God--too, in addition to the Father--is part and parcel of knowledge of eternal life, then he missed a great opportunity to mention that one very important thing; well, he didn’t mention it; it must not be important and, for that matter, true. ///

 

Rob:

>>> Although I do not need to offer an explanation for why Jesus did not mention his being the one true God with the Father at this particular moment, I happen to have an explanation. Jesus humbled himself and came to glorify the Father, and he abided by the principle that one should not seek his own glory (e.g., John 7:18). This principle actually resonated with the honor/shame culture in which Jesus lived (as just one example, see Prov. 27:2). Christ's focus in John 17:3 was to honor his Father when addressing him humbly in prayer (as the divine Son incarnate, fully human). <<<

 

Aaron:

/// You're saying that Jesus (the only true God) humbled himself and came to glorify the Father (the only true God), and he, Jesus, (the only true God) abided by the principle that one should not seek his (the only true God's) own glory (e.g., John 7:18). This principle actually resonated with the honor/shame culture in which Jesus (the only true God) lived (as just one example, see Prov. 27:2). Christ's (the only true God's) focus in John 17:3 was to honor his (the only true God's) Father (the only true God) when addressing him (the only true God) humbly in prayer (as the divine Son incarnate, fully human).

And this is what you offer as an explanation of why Jesus did not mention his being the one true God? ///