Does John 17:3 Exclude Others, Such as Jesus Christ, as the "True God"? Part 5

Here's the last part of my exchange with Rob.

Bowman's Third Rebuttal and Final Remarks 

I’m going to answer the material from your series in a somewhat different order so as to bring related comments together, though I will indicate which part (of your 9-part series) I am citing or answering as I go along. To avoid confusion, I will label my responses with capital letters instead of numbers.

A. WHAT MIGHT JOHN 17:3 MEAN?

In this Part A, I will be responding to your Parts 1 and 6. Let’s start by revisiting what I labeled P1 and P2:

P1. Only the Father is the true God.

P2. The Father is the only true God.

In Part 1, you wrote:

// In your first rebuttal, you stated: "John 17:3 *expresses* P2, *not* P1, and orthodox Christians accept P2" (asterisks added). Then I asked if you're saying that John 17:3 *strictly* requires the P2 expression. You replied: "No, I'm saying it *need not* mean P1 but *might* mean just P2" (asterisks added). I see that you went from a hard claim to a soft one. //

Actually, my claim didn’t change, though I can see that a lack of clarity on my part made it seem that way. You see, as I distinguished these two premises, if P1 is true then P2 must also be true, but the reverse is not the case: If P2 is true, then P1 might or might not be true. Thus, when I argued that John 17:3 expresses P2, I was saying that all we can with certainty infer from John 17:3 is that P2 is true; whether P1 is also true remains to be determined. John 17:3 certainly expresses P2; whether it also expresses P1 is debated. To put it in plain English, if the Father is the only true God, then it might or might not also be the case that *only* the Father (to the exclusion of the Son or the Holy Spirit) is the true God.

I had argued that we should distinguish two interpretations of John 17:3, to wit:

P1: Only the Father is the true God.

P2: The Father is the only true God.

In your Part 6, after some explanation of your reasoning concerning the apposition in John 17:3, you offered what you said was a third interpretation:

P3: Only the Father is the only true God.

From my perspective, there is no substantive difference between P1 and P3. I don’t think setting forth P3 in any way advances the discussion. Sorry.

As I have explained, if P1 is true, then P2 must also be true, but the reverse is not the case. One might affirm P2 (as I do) without affirming P1 (as in my case, since I do not affirm P1). P2 is logically entailed in P1, but (I argued) P1 is not logically entailed in P2. At the very least, P1 asserts something more than P2 as I and many others understand it.

On the other hand, P1 and P3 entail one another fully and without qualification. P3 just restates P1 perhaps more emphatically via redundancy, but it does not add anything of substance to P1, because anyone who affirms P1 will affirm P3, and anyone who affirms P3 will affirm P1. This observation cuts across theological lines, since Unitarians, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and (at least some) Monarchical Trinitarians accept both P1 and P3 (and of course, as I have explained, they all accept P2).

You wrote (also in Part 6):

// I then replied saying that I didn't see anywhere that I conceded the point and that I was still maintaining that the appositive merely *allows* the interchangeability of "Father" and "the only true God" as subject and predicate, not that it *logically* must be. I continued "I see no restriction to this. You would need to provide an argument why P2 (The Father is the only true God) is *strictly* the required expression of John 17:3, if this is your position." (This is because in your first rebuttal you stated that John 17:3 *expresses* P2, *not* P1, and orthodox Christians accept P2.) Then after I pressed if you're saying that John 17:3 *strictly* requires the P2 expression, you replied in your second rebuttal stating that it *need not* mean P1 but *might* mean just P2. So, you went from a hard claim to a soft one. Again, I don't claim that the said interchangeability is a necessity. I only claim that the grammar allows it. As shown, P3 is established from the appositive found in John 17:3, the allowable interchangeability, and a logical conversion. To repeat what you claimed: John 17:3 *need not* mean P1 but *might* mean just P2. I would just say that John 17:3 *could* mean P3. //

Again, I did not change from a “hard” claim to a “soft” claim regarding P1 and P2. My position has always been that P2 does not logically require P1.

Oddly, you missed a key element of my reply to your comments that you quoted above. In reply to your comment that I need to provide an argument for interpreting John 17:3 to mean P2 but not P1, I wrote:

“I'm not using John 17:3 in an attempt to disprove your position. The burden of proof is on you, not on me. You must show not just that the appositive allows such interchangeability but that it requires it. To answer your objection, all I need do is to show that the appositive does not necessarily require such interchangeability.”

Let me expand just a bit on this point. If all you are claiming is that the grammar of John 17:3 “allows” a full interchangeability between “Father” and “only true God,” then you cannot use that possible full interchangeability to make a strong case that Jesus is not the true God. What I would suggest is that you must decide which of the following propositions you wish to defend:

P1/P3: Only the Father is the (only) true God.

P4: It could be the case that only the Father is the (only) true God.

There is no way to get logically from P4 to the conclusion, “Therefore, Jesus is not the true God.” You need P1/P3 as a premise of your argument.

Really, I could stop here. Again, I am not using John 17:3 to disprove Unitarianism but only responding to an attempt to use John 17:3 to disprove the belief that Jesus is the true God. If you aren’t claiming that John 17:3 disproves the belief that Jesus is the true God but only that it might be interpreted in a way incompatible with that belief, then I don’t really need to refute that interpretation.

B. EXAMPLE AND COUNTEREXAMPLES

Here I will be responding to most of your Part 2. You wrote:

// To repeat, I said in my first rejoinder that I'd like to hear you engage my statement: In John 17:3 "only" is used as a quantifier, which is making a quantification that the "true God" is *none* other than the Father. //

The Greek word μόνος is a “quantifier” (as is the English word “only”), meaning that it is an expression that indicates the scope of the term to which it is attached (in this instance, “true God,” ἀληθινὸν θεὸν). However, whether it indicates, as you put it, “that the ‘true God’ is *none* other than the Father” is precisely the point at issue here.

Your Part 2 focused mainly on your proposed example to show that “the Father is the only true God” and “Only the Father is the true God” are identical propositions, and my two examples to show that we should be cautious about making that claim if it results in the Bible contradicting itself. Let’s look first at your example. You wrote:

// I said that "from the standpoint of the way the language is used in the Bible, it does not matter where 'only' is placed. We know that the statements 'Jesus is the only begotten Son' and 'only Jesus is the begotten Son' have the same meaning in so far as 'only' is placed in the statements. //

In my first response to the above statement, I pointed out that in the New Testament the expression “only begotten” translates one word, μονογενής, and therefore you cannot move “only” to a different place in the sentence while leaving “begotten” in the same place. That still seems to be a relevant response to your example. I should also have pointed out that your example sentences are not in the Bible, so they cannot illustrate “the way the language is used in the Bible.” I do agree that your two hypothetical sentences might seem to mean the same thing in English, but they definitely would not mean the same thing if translated into Greek with μονογενής used to represent “only begotten.”

Now let’s look at my two examples of the principle that the word “only” should not always be interpreted in the fashion your argument requires. You wrote:

// In Gen. 7:23, we can see the context; it's right there in front of us, and a little reading comprehension would help. Although in singular form, the word "only" is used in a collective sense. Question: Who is/are left? Answer: Noah *and* those that were with him in the ark. There is nothing else that is predicated to "those that were with him in the ark" but "only". //

Here’s the Greek text of the relevant clause in Genesis 7:23 LXX:

καὶ κατελείφθη μόνος Νωε καὶ οἱ μετʼ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ κιβωτῷ

“And Noah only was left, and those with him in the ark.”

Here the verb κατελείφθη (“was left”) is singular, not plural; the subject of the verb, grammatically speaking, is Νωε (“Noah”). The grammatical subject of the verb is not the collective “Noah and those with him in the ark.” To translate it, “Noah and those with him in the ark alone were left” (treating the verb as a plural and μόνος as referring to both Noah and those with him in the ark) is an acceptable paraphrase, but it is not a literal translation of the Greek text. Grammatically, μόνος modifies Νωε; it does not modify οἱ μετʼ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ κιβωτῷ. Nevertheless, by reading it in context, we construe the sense of the sentence in such a way that “those with him in the ark” were left with Noah. But that isn’t how the sentence is worded, which was the point I was making.

Regarding John 8:9, you wrote:

// How about the way "only" is used in John 8:9. ESV renders the text as follows: "But when they heard it, they went away one by one, beginning with the older ones, and Jesus was left alone with [kai] the woman standing before him." ESV and some other English versions do translate kai as "with" (e.g., HCSB, NIV, NRSV, MOUNCE). Others translate it as "and" (e.g., ASV, NASB). As you know, since you're expert in Greek, this means that the Greek allows translating kai as "with" and "and". It's remarkable that you would translate this text to say that Jesus "was left alone [monos], and [kai] the woman who as in the midst" (John 8:9b)--not that you disagree translating kai as "with"; I would hope not. So, question: Who is/are left alone? Answer: Jesus *and* the woman; Jesus *with* the woman. Either way the context tells us that there were two left: Jesus and the woman. //

Again, the issue is not how we should translate the sentence in order to bring out its sense in good, smooth English. The issue is what the Greek text actually says—how the sentence is constructed in Greek. Here is the Greek text:

καὶ κατελείφθη μόνος καὶ ἡ γυνὴ ἐν μέσῳ οὖσα.

“And only he was left, and the woman who was in the midst.”

Here we have the same verb as in Genesis 7:9 LXX, κατελείφθη, which is a singular form. The subject is not stated but is singular, “he,” not plural, “they.” The syntax parallels Genesis 7:9 LXX rather closely though without the personal name: κατελείφθη μόνος, followed by καὶ, followed by an expression identifying others who were left: ἡ γυνὴ ἐν μέσῳ οὖσα. In both texts, the verb is singular and has as its subject one person (Noah, Jesus), not two or more.

Of course, when translating the text into English, one might opt for a smoother translation such as “And only he was left along with the woman,” or even “And only he and the woman were left.” But we are discussing your claim that the grammar of the Greek text in John 17:3 locks us into the conclusion that only the Father, to the exclusion of the Son (or the Holy Spirit), is the true God. In that context, I am pointing out that sometimes the Greek texts use the word μόνος in such a way that grammatically, if pressed strictly in the kind of way you are doing with John 17:3, you would conclude that the text was contradicting itself.

As I acknowledged when I first presented this argument, the construction in these two texts is a different one than the construction in John 17:3. But the principle is the same: We must beware of overreading the grammar in such a way as to make the Bible contradict itself.

Following up on my warning that construing “only” in such a way as to result in the Bible contradicting itself is “woodenly simplistic,” you wrote:

// But, let's assume arguendo that you're right about characterizing my approach as "a woodenly simplistic grammatical analysis". What happens then? Answer: All the talk about P1 and P2 you've been making should be relegated to the trash bin of "a woodenly simplistic grammatical analysis". //

My distinction between P1 and P2 is not based on a wooden or simplistic grammatical analysis, but is, rather, an argument for not assuming P1 on the basis of such an analysis! I don’t think your attempt at deflection here works at all.

C. LOGIC, GOD, AND THE INCARNATION

This post will be brief; it responds to your closing comments in your Part 2. You wrote:

// "You're saying that, if God is triune, the logic of predication is stipulated to work somewhat differently. Is it because God is unique in that God is triune? Explain how this is. You're not saying that logic works differently when comes to God. Are you? I hope not. I would like you to be as clear as you possibly can when you explain yourself here please." //

To be more precise, I’m saying that logic has limits when applied to ontological issues pertaining to God due to the radical transcendence and uniqueness of the divine being. You might find these two blog posts of mine helpful to understand my thinking on this subject:

https://robertbowman.net/2019/04/18/dale-tuggy-and-the-biblical-basis-of-the-trinity-part-2-is-the-doctrine-of-the-trinity-incoherent/

https://robertbowman.net/2018/07/25/the-light-analogy-theological-method-and-the-doctrine-of-the-trinity/

You wrote:

// Whatever the case maybe, I wonder how far you would go with your "finite beings" versus "divine persons united as/in one divine being" talk. Of the divine persons you referred to, I'm sure, is Jesus Christ. You believe that he is God-man, divine-human, and infinite-finite. If we follow your line of reasoning, it would seem that the application of the Bible talk on only would apply to the finite part (man/human) of Jesus but not to his infinite part (God/divine). He declares in John 17:3, "And this is eternal life, that they know you [Father], the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent." Jesus Christ is God-man. The Bible talk on only would apply to the "man part" of Jesus Christ, but would not apply to the "God part" of him. How would you manage to explain this? //

No, it doesn’t work that way. The hypostatic union of divine nature and human nature in one person (Jesus Christ) is itself another theological concept with which one would expect to run up against limits to logical analysis. It isn’t just God in the abstract that is the occasion of such limits, but also God in relation to the world (see my response to Tuggy cited above for an example). The Incarnation is simply a more profound and pointed instance of this problem of limits to logical analysis regarding God.

D. ARGUMENTS AND ASSUMPTIONS

In this Part D, I will be responding to your Parts 3, 4, and 5. In Part 3, you wrote:

// We, Unitarians, *do* have an argument, and in our exchange I framed the argument (and provided details), namely: "From the standpoint of the way the language is used in the Bible, it does not matter where 'only' is placed." Now, Rob, in your constant auto-accusation of "assuming Unitarianism," you have continually mischaracterized what Unitarians are doing: You are conflating the *method* (basis) with the *content* of the view--the method and basis being the application of the way the Bible uses the word only; the content being Unitarianism. Let's just say that my argument does not go through, because you've somehow shown it to be unsuccessful. Fine. That does not mean I have no argument; neither does it mean I'm assuming Unitarianism; only that my argument fails. //

I didn’t deny that you had an argument. I argued in response that your argument presupposed Unitarianism, not that you didn’t present an argument. Arguments have presuppositions or proceed on the basis of assumptions all the time. Saying that you were presupposing Unitarianism was not a denial that you presented arguments.

So far, you have not presented any examples of texts using the word “only” in different places in the sentence in order to illustrate your claim that it does not matter where “only” is placed. That makes it difficult to treat as much of an argument, even though it looks like an argument. Your sole example was of two sentences that you invented that are not in the Bible and in which an English translation (“only begotten”) of a single Greek word (μονογενής) was treated as though it represented two Greek words, one of which was μόνος.

I’m passing over your analogy to debates between advocates of differing models of the Trinity because I think I can get at the problem without going through that analogy point by point.

You wrote:

// Your accusation sounds like this: "Aaron, you're assuming Unitarianism, because you're assuming that your argument for Unitarianism is successful." Well, of course! As you know full well, that's just how things work in the discipline of reasoning and argumentation. What is stopping me from saying to you: "Rob, you're assuming Trinitarianism, because you're assuming that your argument for Trinitarianism is successful"? //

I don’t see things this way at all. As I’ve explained above, one can presuppose or assume something when presenting an argument. People do it all the time. Essentially, what I am saying can be outlined as follows: You argue that A is true, therefore B is true; however, B is a hidden (unstated) assumption of A. I’m certainly not claiming that you must be assuming Unitarianism because you think your argument for it is successful. I have no objection in principle to you presenting an argument that you believe successfully vindicates your position.

I’ll give you a simple example of the type of presupposition or assumption I see in Unitarian arguments all the time. I constantly find Unitarians arguing as follows:

F. God cannot die.

G. Jesus died.

Therefore,

H. Jesus is not God.

The above argument presupposes that Jesus could not be both God and man simultaneously, as is believed in the doctrine of the Incarnation. Thus, it assumes what it claims to be proving. A fuller statement of the argument would give this away:

E. God cannot become incarnate in mortal human nature.

Therefore,

F1’. God cannot die (even by becoming incarnate and undergoing death in his assumed mortal human nature).

G. Jesus died.

Therefore,

H. Jesus is not God.

Yes, this is an argument for Unitarianism, but now we can plainly see that it presupposes what it claims to be proving. That’s an example of what I mean when I say that you could present an argument for your view and yet be assuming or presupposing that your view is true.

In Part 4, you wrote:

// The first horn says, "assume P1 *and* interpret it as excluding the Son as eternal deity (thereby presupposing Unitarianism)." Well, the same Monarchical Trinitarians (I discussed) do assume P1 *and* interpret it as excluding the Son from being "the only true God" with the understanding that "true" is not to be contrasted with "false" but instead expresses how the Father is personally distinct from the Son and the Spirit. Does this, thereby, mean that those Monarchical Trinitarians are presupposing Monarchical Trinitarianism? Your answer would have to be yes, if you're consistent. //

That would be the case if the Monarchical Trinitarians argued that John 17:3, all by itself, proves Monarchical Trinitarianism. Then I would say that yes, if they use John 17:3 in that way, they are assuming that P1 would exclude Jesus as “true God.”

You wrote:

// The first part of the first horn says that I must "assume P1". If you mean "assume" without an argument, that again, Rob, is a mischaracterization of what "assume P1" means. //

As I have already explained, presenting an argument is not incompatible with that argument proceeding on the basis of an unstated assumption or presupposition.

If you are actually acknowledging that the Monarchical Trinitarian position is consistent with John 17:3, then you would not be presupposing Unitarianism. By the same token, then, you would be conceding that John 17:3 does not prove Unitarianism, because it would be consistent with at least some form of Trinitarianism.

Since you seem most concerned throughout your Parts 3 through 5 to counter my evidently offensive saying that your argument for P1 presupposes or assumes Unitarianism, and since perhaps your argument allows Monarchical Trinitarianism as a possible interpretation of the evidence, I will restate my argument so that this particular offensive element is removed. Here goes:

In order to show from John 17:3 that Jesus is not the true God, you must show that John 17:3 means not just that the Father is the only true God but also that the Father alone is the true God to the exclusion of the Son. I claim that you have not successfully shown this to be the case. At most, you have shown that John 17:3 could be interpreted in a way consistent with that view.

In my opinion, your attempt to construct an argument for your conclusion did not go beyond merely asserting it, because you actually gave no evidence for it (recall the problem with your argument about “only begotten”).

Your Part 5 labors under the same false dichotomy between proceeding on the basis of an assumption and constructing an argument. I won’t repeat my response to this false dichotomy again.

E. ARGUMENTS FROM SILENCE

In this Part E, I respond to your Parts 7 and 8, which were responses to my contention that in two instances you presented fallacious arguments from silence.

(1) Not Included, Therefore Excluded

The first argument was the inference from Jesus’ failure to include himself as true God in John 17:3 that Jesus was excluding himself from being true God. I argued that this was an argument from silence. In your Part 7, you replied to that criticism:

// Rob, I don't think I'm guilty of an argument from silence. You painted a caricature of my argument. My argument does not fallaciously draw an inference from the fact that something is *not* stated in the context. Rather, it draws an inference from the fact that something is *implied* by what *is* stated in the context. My argument can correctly be restated as follows.

P1. He included only the Father, and not himself and others.

C. Therefore, he excluded himself and others.

Most people do seem to take for granted that that which is not included is excluded, which by itself can be an argument from silence, depending on the context. But my argument doesn't commit this fallacy. As can be seen in the restatement, the words "only" and "did not include" bring out the implication of *exclusivity*. //

Aaron, everyone agrees that there is exclusivity expressed (not just “implied”) in John 17:3. To assert that there is an “only true God” is to exclude all other Gods as being “true God.” That is what the words mean. Everyone agrees on this point.

I was not criticizing you for understanding John 17:3 to express an exclusivity, but for your specific inference that the statement necessarily excludes Jesus Christ from being “true God.” Your restated argument still infers this particular exclusion from the lack of a stated inclusion of Jesus Christ. And that is an argument from silence.

You wrote:

// When I asked you the two questions above, you replied stating that Jesus *excluded* "anyone that would claim or be viewed as a different God than the one true God" and that his "statement only specifically included the Father." Now, how in the world did you manage to draw "excluded" from what Jesus declared in John 17:3 which reads: “And this is eternal life, that they know you [Father], the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent”? You don't see "excluded" there. It is not stated. Does this mean you're guilty of "a blatant argument from silence"? It would appear so. //

Not at all. My statement that Jesus’ statement excluded other Gods makes no reference to what is not verbally included but proceeds directly and solely from the words “only true God.” If there is an “only true God,” then any *other* (so-called) God would not be “true God.” The word “only” is exclusionary by definition. Thus, my statement simply reasserted in other words what the words “only true God” entail. I made no appeal whatsoever to what was not said in John 17:3 or who was not stated there to be “included” as true God. But you did make such an argument, and it is an argument from silence.

(2) Not Stated There, Therefore Not Important or Even True

The second argument I described as an argument from silence was your argument that if knowing Christ as the true God is crucial for salvation, then Christ should have mentioned this fact in John 17:3; and since he did not, you inferred not only that it wasn’t important for salvation but that it wasn’t even true. You replied to my criticism in your Part 8:

// I said that I maintain that if Christ being the only true God--too, in addition to the Father--is part and parcel of knowledge of eternal life, then he missed a great opportunity to mention that one very important information. Well, he didn’t mention it. It must not be important and, for that matter, true…. I don't think it is an argument from silence. I would call it an argument from extreme importance. For you, the following is an extremely important and non-negotiable aspect of Christianity: Part and parcel of *knowledge* of eternal life is Jesus being God in the same sense as the Father is. In other words, in order to attain eternal life one must accept and hence have knowledge of Jesus being God. Yet, for you, "knowledge" of that which is *extremely* important and *non-negotiable* was not important *enough* to be mentioned by Jesus in John 17:3 or anywhere within the immediate context of the text. On the other hand, I think that, if it is *that* important, we would expect Jesus to mention it *and* be direct about it. //

I believe I have already addressed your argument. You are imposing on Jesus in his prayer at that particular moment an expectation that does not follow from the belief that Christ’s being the true God is a salvific issue. It was not incumbent on Jesus to present that truth whenever he spoke about salvation or about the deity of the Father, even if that truth was one that would eventually come to be recognized as of salvific importance. Jesus almost always spoke about his identity indirectly, in ambiguous terms.

I have given two reasons why Jesus did not talk openly and explicitly about his deity during his mortal ministry. The first is that Jesus was part of an honor/shame culture in which it was inappropriate to assert honors for oneself. Instead, one was to receive honor from someone in a position to bestow it. The Son had humbled himself, becoming a man, and in doing so had chosen to place himself in a situation in which full recognition of his deity would come through his vindication following his resurrection and ascension. Second, Jesus’ contemporaries, prior to his resurrection and ascension and the subsequent coming of the Holy Spirit, would likely not have understood a direct claim to deity as other than a claim to be the Father. These two explanations, which are complementary and not mutually exclusive of one another, are not strictly speaking logically necessary in order to rebut the objection that Jesus should have revealed that he was the true God in John 17:3. But these explanations are sufficient plausible as to negate the seeming plausibility of the argument that he should have mentioned his deity at that particular point in time.

Again, the argument is indeed an argument from silence. Calling it “an argument from extreme importance” does not eliminate the appeal to silence that is part of the argument. Your argument still has the following form:

M. If Christ being the true God were of extreme importance for salvation, then Jesus would have mentioned his deity in John 17:3.

N. Jesus did not mention his being the true God in John 17:3.

Therefore,

O. Christ being the true God is not of extreme importance for salvation.

That’s an argument from silence (because premise N consists of an assertion of silence).

Moreover, you went even further. Remember, you wrote:

// Well, he didn’t mention it. It must not be important and, for that matter, true. //

That last part—“and, for that matter, true”—clearly goes beyond the evidence of your premises.

Finally, let me say that I do not think it is a salvific issue to know that non-Monarchical Trinitarianism, over against Monarchical Trinitarianism, is true. I don’t think Monarchical Trinitarians are in jeopardy of missing out on salvation. In this respect, it is not essential to salvation to know that Jesus is properly called “true God” in the sense denied by Monarchical Trinitarians.

F. CONCLUSION

Aaron, this Part F responds to your concluding Part 9. You wrote:

// In my OP, I wrote at the end: "Together these considerations seem to make a cumulative case for thinking that John 17:3 excludes others—such as Jesus—as the 'true God' or 'the only true God'". Notice that I used the word *seem*. I was trying to be modest. Thus far, I believe that I've been able make a good case based on four considerations as they stand together and in view of the refutations I provided. To be sure, I have to wait for your final remarks to see if my case stands. //

Very well: Let’s review those four considerations from your opening post. You wrote there:

// 1. The language of the text appears to exclude Jesus as true God. If the Father is the only true God, then no one else is. //

In our subsequent discussion, you explained, “the appositive merely *allows* the interchangeability of ‘Father’ and ‘the only true God’ as subject and predicate, not that it *logically* must be.” But if the two terms might not always be interchangeable, then it might be the case that Jesus is true God. So this consideration does not make it more probable than not that Jesus Christ is not true God. You would need to strengthen your claim to say that the appositive probably or most likely entails complete interchangeability in all contexts (see further my Part A).

I also showed that your one example offered to illustrate that “the Father is the only true God” means the same thing in biblical language as “only the Father is the true God” failed to support your argument. Your example made the mistake of treating “only begotten” as representing two words in Greek when that expression represents one Greek word, μονογενής. Moreover, your example sentences are not found in the New Testament (see my Part B).

I also noted that when you brought up the Monarchical Trinitarians who accept the deity of Christ but consider the Father alone to be the “true God” (in the sense of the divine person who is neither begotten nor proceeding from another), you were in effect admitting that even if only the Father is “true God,” this conclusion would not disprove the deity of Christ or the Trinity. At most, your line of argument criticizes the non-Monarchical type of Trinitarianism that affirms that the Son is the true God. Do you agree that your argument has that limitation?

In your opening post, your second point was as follows:

// 2. …According to the text, the only person Jesus places in the category “the only true God” is the Father—no one else. Jesus does not include himself in the category (nor does he include anyone else). …Since he does not include himself, it would follow that he is excluding himself from being in the category "the only true God". //

In response, I have argued that this second point of yours is a fallacious argument from silence. See my Part E, subpart (1). From the fact that Jesus did not include himself, it does not follow that he excluded himself.

Your third point was as follows:

// 3. Being that it is appositive, the grammar interchangeably allows “you [Father]” and “the only true God” as subject and predicate, which logically points to the exclusion of Jesus as the only true God (unless the Bible teaches Modalism). We may grammatically construct the appositive as (1) "The Father is the only true God" and (2) "The only true God is the Father." These constructions show that the only true God *just is* the Father: Father=the only true God; the only true God=Father. They have the form a=b and b=a. A number of Trinity theories hold the view that Jesus is (the only true) God (in addition to God the Father). However, if Jesus is God in this sense, it would follow that Jesus is identical to the Father, which the said Trinity theories deny. //

It would follow that Jesus is identical to the Father if and only if the words “you, the only true God” do in fact certainly express an absolute interchangeability between “you” (the Father) and “the only true God.” But you stated that the grammar merely “allows” this interpretation and that “we may” construe it in that way. This leads me to the point already made that unless that complete interchangeability is shown to be actually the case (rather than just a possible or plausible understanding), the text cannot be used to prove that only the Father is properly described as “true God.” Therefore, your conclusion that Trinitarian theories that hold that Jesus is “true God” imply modalism does not follow.

Your fourth point was as follows:

// 4. If Jesus being the only true God is part and parcel of knowledge of eternal life, then he missed a great opportunity to mention that one very important thing. Well, Jesus didn’t mention it. It must not be important and, for that matter, true. //

As I explained in my Part E, subsection (2), this is another argument from silence.

You concluded your opening post as follows:

// Together these considerations seem to make a cumulative case for thinking that John 17:3 excludes others—such as Jesus—as the “true God” or “the only true God”. //

Your four considerations boil down to what you acknowledged was just a possible or plausible understanding of the apposition in John 17:3 (in your first and third points) and two arguments that I explained are arguments from silence (your second and fourth points). I do not think such a collocation of four points constitutes a strong cumulative case.

If you’re going to develop a genuinely cumulative case, you’re going to need to engage potential evidence against the conclusion, especially potential evidence relatively close at hand to the evidence you think supports your conclusion. This would mean taking into account that elsewhere in the same book the author refers to Jesus Christ as “God” (John 1:1; 20:28; possibly 1:18) and that in another book the same author most likely refers to Jesus Christ as “the true God and eternal life” (1 John 5:20). Naturally, you won’t agree with me on 1 John 5:20, but I think the exegetical evidence there is quite strong, and in any case John 20:28 is virtually certain.

Aaron, I appreciate so much the kindness and respect with which you have conducted this discussion. Thank you for your friendship despite our theological differences. I would also like to say that you are one of the sharpest Unitarians whom I have encountered. I consider the time and effort involved in this exchange to have been worth it.